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INTRODUCTION
Government often provides space for private speech but doesn’t want
to help foster hateful or vulgar messages. Under current Supreme Court
case law, however, such viewpoint restrictions1 are impermissible whether
the state is regulating private speech or limiting it in speech platforms it
creates (often called “limited public forums”). Only if we could properly
see the speech as that of the state may it discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint, but usually it is a mistake to view the speech that way.
My main claim in this Article is that the First Amendment, properly
understood, permits greater state control over speech platforms than current
case law allows. Thus, the state should be permitted to open public school
classrooms for after-school student speech activities without having to host
the KKK or Nazi club. It should be permitted to open advertising space on
public transit vehicles without having to allow ads that disparage persons
by race or other protected characteristics. It should be permitted to offer
specialty or vanity license plates without having to allow hateful or vulgar
messages. Despite the arguments of several scholars and the Court itself,
the case for such viewpoint-based speech platform restrictions does not
properly arise from the state’s fear that the hateful or vulgar messages will
be misattributed to it. Nor is it proper, as some scholars have suggested, to
see these settings as “mixed speech” of the state and the private person.
The misattribution argument is mostly mistaken, and although mixed
speech might occur in some settings, in many of these settings the speech is
clearly that of the private person. We should understand the concept of the
speech platform as a new idea in free speech doctrine, distinguishing more
sharply the reasons supporting strong free speech protection from
government regulation, and analogizing more closely to why we permit
great latitude for government speech. In so doing, we should permit
government to draw some lines based on speech content, even viewpoint,
and back down from our normal regulatory concerns about the dangers and
difficulties of drawing such lines.
The insistence on sticking with the government speech/limited public
forum dichotomy led the Court to the unsatisfying but instructive opinions
in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.2 When
Texas established a system of selling specialty license plates, and permitted
all manner of statements on those plates, it put itself in a bind when it

1. Restrictions on hate speech are clearly based on viewpoint; restrictions on vulgarity are
arguably viewpoint based (I argue below that they are). See infra text accompanying notes 257–64.
2. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
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wanted to reject a specialty plate with a Confederate flag.3 It’s hard to see
all the specialty plate messages as that of the state; it’s also hard to accept a
symbol of the Confederacy in this state-created speech forum (and hard to
have to accept what would follow, i.e., pretty much everything else anyone
wanted to say via a specialty plate). The competing opinions don’t make
sense—the majority’s attempt at deeming these specialty plate messages
government speech doesn’t ring true; but the result of the dissent’s more
speech-protective view would mean that the state has to allow all sorts of
odious messages if it wants to offer specialty plates. The right answer is to
see this not as state speech or through the limited public forum model that,
borrowing from the regulatory speech model, forbids viewpoint
restrictions. Instead, we should understand settings such as this as statecreated platforms for private speech. Because such settings aren’t
regulatory—no jail time, no fines, just acceptance or rejection of the
message for the forum—we should not hold the state to a firm rule against
viewpoint restrictions.
This Article develops the concept of the speech platform4 in six parts.
Part I explores public forum doctrine, with a focus on limited public
forums. It makes sense to have standard tough free speech doctrine for
traditional public forums and designated public forums, but insisting on a
rule of viewpoint neutrality for limited or nonpublic forums has been a
mistake.5 This rule has been stated mostly in dicta; the holdings are about
religious speech and justifiable in narrower ways. One of the lessons from
the religious speech cases is a properly cabined understanding of when
private speech is attributable to the state, an understanding that will help us
when we turn to the concern about misattribution in speech platform
settings more generally.
Part II sets forth the case for a robust understanding of government
speech, an understanding supported by Court doctrine. The state as speaker
rather than regulator is not subject to standard free speech rules. Although
the state may not coerce or monopolize speech in the guise of state speech,
and although the state should be transparent about its role in speaking or
hiring agents to speak for it, mostly these concerns are not dominant, and
we should accept a broad range of state speech, on matters both

3. See id. at 2245.
4. When I use the term “speech platform” I will always be referring to state-provided
opportunities for private speech.
5. As I discuss further, infra text accompanying note 15, the Court has sometimes called this
third type of forum “limited” and sometimes “nonpublic” (and sometimes it has used the term “limited”
to describe a certain type of “designated” public forum). We should be concerned about the concepts,
though, and not the nomenclature, and I will refer to the type of forum at issue in Walker and similar
settings as a “limited public forum.”
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uncontroversial and controversial. The state is usually just one speaker in a
broad social conversation; citizens understand this; and the state has a role
to play in advancing its notions of the good. This strong view of
government speech will lay the foundation for the speech platforms
concept—although there I will shift ground from state speech to the
creation of opportunities for private speech.
Part III turns to Walker. The opinions rely on the limited public forum
and government speech models in ways that are true to the models
conceptually. I share the majority’s instinct that Texas should have some
discretion here, but deem it unfortunate that doctrinally the only way to
reach this result was to deem the specialty plates government speech. That
doesn’t make sense at first blush (is Texas really advancing as its own the
hundreds of disparate specialty plate messages?), and the concern about
avoiding misattribution is an error. The dissent’s tracking limited public
forum doctrine seems sound, and its answer correct per that doctrine, but
the fallout would be dramatic: either accept all manner of hateful, vulgar,
odious messages in state-created speech forums, or shut those forums
down. If a state or locality didn’t want to accept the KKK or Nazi specialty
plate, or vanity plate, or transit ad, or after-school club, then it would have
to shut down those forums entirely. That doesn’t seem right,6 and the core
affirmative thrust of this Article explores ways of understanding the First
Amendment anew to permit the state to provide, but limit, the speech
platforms it creates.
Part IV explores an issue that is key to the majority in Walker and to
much case law and scholarship regarding speech forums—the risk of the
public misattributing private messages to the state. I will make three main
points here: first, a key lesson from the religious speech limited public
forum cases is that when the state opens a forum for a wide array of speech,
we don’t reasonably attribute any of the messages to the state, and thus the
state’s interest in limiting speech in these forums isn’t to avoid
misattribution; second, it’s unclear whether the state has a legitimate
interest in avoiding misattribution to it, except perhaps insofar as a
constitutional right is implicated by state action; third, rather, the state’s
interest is in not providing a platform for hateful, vulgar, and other similar
messages.
Part V responds to scholars who also deem the majority/dissent debate
in Walker unsatisfying, but who believe a “mixed speech” model is the way
to go. That approach claims that some state-provided speech opportunities

6. Speech platforms have value to many speakers, providing audiences and/or settings for
expression that might be hard to duplicate. This is clearly so for transit ads and public school
classrooms for after-school activities, perhaps less so for specialty and vanity license plates.
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are best seen as a blend of state and private speech, and thus that we need a
blend of doctrine from the government speech and limited public forum
models. Although perhaps mixed speech accurately describes the
occasional setting, it does not accurately capture what is usually going
on—the state providing a platform for private speech, but not wanting to
aid and abet offensive messages. Part of the problem with the mixed speech
model is that it too turns on an overly expansive concern about
misattribution of private speech to the state.
Part VI develops the concept of the speech platform.7 Most of the
settings discussed in the Article—state-created spaces for speech (oral or
written)—are not best deemed government speech, but a strict rule of
viewpoint neutrality would require the state to help foster (although not
endorse) a wide variety of odious messages. If we stick with standard free
speech doctrine, we will be stuck with this all-or-nothing answer. But
standard free speech doctrine has been developed to limit the government
as a regulatory entity. Affirmative First Amendment values can be
preserved by ensuring strong protection against state regulation. At the core
of the case for similar protection in the speech platforms setting is
“negative theory,”8 i.e., the idea that content-based restrictions on speech
may reflect improper bias or may involve line-drawing void of properly
neutral principles.9 This idea, though, stems from the need to limit the
government as regulator; negative theory should occupy a smaller place
when the state is providing speech opportunities. Although these are not
instances of government speech, we can borrow from government speech
doctrine—just as negative theory is the wrong approach there, so is it the
wrong approach to thinking about speech platforms. There are good
reasons for not opening speech platforms to hateful or vulgar messages,
i.e., the direct harm to persons from hate speech and the more diffuse but
still real harm to public sensibilities from vulgarity. Although we would not
allow regulation of private speech on these grounds, we should treat speech
platforms differently.

7. For prior sketches of this idea, see Abner S. Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1253 (2011) [hereinafter Greene, Speech Platforms]; Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV.
U. L. REV. 833, 850–53 (2010) [hereinafter Greene, (Mis)Attribution].
8. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 80–86 (1982).
9. A similar idea is that a kind of “evaluative neutrality” is crucial to limiting state action
regarding expression. See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 11, 81,
177 (2005).

1 GREENE - SPEECH PLATFORM - 337-394 (DO NOT DELETE)

342

Alabama Law Review

12/5/2016 12:45 PM

[Vol. 68:2:337

I. LIMITED PUBLIC FORUMS: DESCRIPTION AND CRITIQUE
Justice Alito’s dissent in Walker deems Texas’s specialty license plates
a limited public forum, in which reasonable content-based restrictions are
allowed but viewpoint-based restrictions (a type of content-based
restriction) are barred.10 He correctly states the Court’s doctrine in this
area. But once we examine how the Court has developed its limited public
forum doctrine, we’ll see that the connection to the rest of public forum
doctrine is thin and that much of the “no viewpoint restrictions” rule is
from dicta rather than holdings. There’s less here than one might think,
opening the door to a different way of seeing limited public forums, as
speech platforms over which the state should have more control.
The Court sorts public forums into three categories—traditional public
forums, designated public forums, and limited public forums.11 The first are
mostly streets and parks, which “have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.”12 The middle category “consists of public property which the
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”13
A good example here would be a municipal auditorium or similar space on
a public college campus. In the third category,
the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker’s view. . . . “[T]he State, no less
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the

10. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2262 (2015)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
11. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 45–46 (1983). The term “public forum” was perhaps coined by Kalven, supra note *, at 11–12
(“[I]n an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public places are an important facility
for public discussion and political process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can
commandeer . . . .”).
12. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion); see also Int’l
Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Public places are of necessity the locus for discussion of public issues, as well as
protest . . . .”); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 743 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Public
access is not a matter of grace by government officials but rather is inherent in the open nature of the
locations.”); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (“[O]pportunities for the
communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort
to public places.”).
13. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
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property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.”14
I have to pause to clarify terms. The Court has used both “limited
public forum” and “nonpublic forum” to refer to the third category
mentioned above.15 Although at times I will use “nonpublic forum” to
report the Court’s language, otherwise I will use “limited public forum” to
refer to the third category—where the state limits speech by content in a
speech platform. “Nonpublic forum” isn’t a felicitous term, since these
settings involve some public access and speech and the question is whether
the restrictions are constitutionally valid. Even the phrase “limited public
forum” could use some sprucing up, and I will introduce the term “speech
platform” to take its place.
Beginning with Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,16 the
Court has rejected the argument that because streets and parks are public
property, the state may do with them what it pleases, including limiting
expression broadly. In so doing, the Court has refused to defer to
governmental statements of purpose regarding these spaces. That streets are
built primarily to facilitate getting from one place to another, and that parks
are built primarily for recreation, may be true facts, but they are of limited
relevance to public forum doctrine. Although in dissent, Justice Brennan
made the point nicely: “Public sidewalks, parks, and streets have been
reserved for public use as forums for speech even though government has

14. Id. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg Civics Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114,
129–30 (1981)).
15. For use of “limited public forum” to refer to the third category, see, e.g., Walker v. Texas
Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2262 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting);
Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 & n.11; Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 105–06
(2001); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 (1981). For use of “nonpublic forum” to refer to the third
category, see, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797, 800,
806 (1985) and Perry, 460 U.S. at 49. The Court has sometimes used “limited public forum” to refer to
a speaker-based limit in a designated public forum—for example, a public college auditorium open for
student use only. See, e.g., id. at 46 n.7. For a recent example of a Justice using the terms
interchangeably, see American Freedom Defense Initiative v. King County, 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“But if the government creates a limited
public forum (also called a nonpublic forum) . . . .”).
One commenter on a draft of this Article insisted that we keep “designated” and “limited” public
forums cordoned off from “nonpublic” forums, that there is a presumption in favor of speech in the
former two categories, and that the latter “aren’t public forums in any sense of the term.” Perhaps the
Court has used “nonpublic” forum for more idiosyncratic settings in which speech opportunities are
created in a more structured way—e.g., Perry and Cornelius. I am focusing on settings in which the
state’s principal action is setting up opportunities for private speech; I admit the doctrine (sometimes
dicta) is (mostly) favorable to free speech (but see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974)); my goal is to justify a somewhat broader content-based authority for the government regarding
what I suggest are best termed “speech platforms.”
16. 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
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not constructed them for expressive purposes.”17 Instead, we have a cultural
commitment to streets and parks as, in addition to their primary purposes,
places for expressive activity.18 In a key early case, Schneider v. New
Jersey, the Court struck down a ban on leafleting, stating that “the streets
are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and
opinion.”19
The First Amendment “right of the people peaceably to assemble”20
plays a role here along with freedom of speech.21 The Court has made clear
that assembly, often for expressive purposes, is an important function of
traditional public forums. This started with Hague, rejecting the state’s
plenary power view of regulating public space: streets and parks “have
been used for purposes of assembly.”22 Albeit in dicta, the Court referred to
the “right of assembly” in Cox v. New Hampshire23 and then, as part of its
holding, to the “rights of free speech and assembly” in Cox v. Louisiana.24
Later, Justice Kennedy wrote: “At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the
principle that in a free nation citizens must have the right to gather and
speak with other persons in public places.”25
Furthermore, because of the cultural commitment to parks and streets
as places to assemble to exchange ideas, not only are statements of state
purpose insufficient to limit such expression, but also the state may not shut
down streets and parks altogether for expression. Thus, the Court has “held
17. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 744 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 696–97
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations omitted) (“The notion that traditional
public forums are properties that have public discourse as their principal purpose is a most doubtful
fiction. The types of property that we have recognized as the quintessential public forums are streets,
parks, and sidewalks. It would seem apparent that the principal purpose of streets and sidewalks . . . is
to facilitate transportation, not public discourse, and we have recognized as much. Similarly, the
purpose for the creation of public parks may be as much for beauty and open space as for discourse.”).
18. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 61–67 (2000).
19. 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. But see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 205 (1995) (originally published as Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987)) (“There is . . . no implicit concept of a
public forum, at least insofar as the phrase is meant to signify a special geographical location or
category of government property where speech merits unusual protection.”). For instructive writing on
the right or freedom of assembly, see JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM
OF ASSEMBLY (2012); TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2009).
22. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
23. 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941); see also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the “constitutional right to assemble”).
24. 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965); see also Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)
(“[G]overnment may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend
to say.”).
25. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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that an ordinance completely prohibiting the dissemination of ideas on the
city streets cannot be justified on the ground that the municipality holds
legal title to them.”26
In traditional public forums, standard free speech rules apply. That
means the state may regulate speech based on content only pursuant to
various categorical tests (e.g., incitement, fighting words, obscenity, libel)
or if the state action otherwise satisfies ad hoc strict scrutiny.27 It may
regulate speech in a non-content-based way by controlling the time, place,
or manner of expression (subject to intermediate scrutiny)28 or pursuant to a
law of general applicability that burdens expression as a side effect only
(ostensibly subject to intermediate scrutiny).29
Finally, almost all of the cases about expression in traditional public
forums, or about whether such a forum exists, involve political or other
high-value speech.30
All of these points—the cultural commitment to traditional public
forums as a place for expression notwithstanding state purpose otherwise;
the connection to the right of assembly; the bar to total elimination of
expression in traditional public forums; and the holdings and dicta stating
that standard free speech rules apply, but almost always in political speech
cases—will help us distinguish what the Court is up to when it assesses
state power and individual expressive rights in limited public forums.
Before turning to the focus here—limited public forums and the
purported rule against viewpoint restrictions therein—first a word about the
middle category, so-called “designated public forums.” The idea is that the
26. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504–05 (1946) (citing Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943)); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]hen property is a
protected public forum the State may not by fiat assert broad control over speech or expressive
activities; it must alter the objective physical character or uses of the property, and bear the attendant
costs, to change the property’s forum status.”); POST, supra note 21, at 231; Kalven, supra note *, at
15–21; Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 244–46.
But see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 & n.13 (1965) (discussing arguments both ways on this
point).
27. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990) (plurality opinion); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
28. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
29. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The O’Brien test is often said to be
intermediate scrutiny, but it operates like rational basis scrutiny.
30. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lee, 505 U.S. at
672, 830; Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (plurality opinion); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Walker v. City
of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948);
Jamison, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147 (1939); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion).
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state sometimes might set up space for expressive activity generally,
without content limits; if so, the state is held to the same free speech rules
as in traditional public forums. There are few Court holdings, however,
deeming public space to be a designated public forum.31 Furthermore,
although several dissents have argued that once the state has opened space
for certain expressive activity it is estopped from denying such space to
other expression, the Court has consistently allowed the state to establish
speech opportunities for more limited ends without opening the door to
having created a designated public forum.32 These holdings have led some
Justices and commentators to suggest the designated public forum category
is more ephemeral than real.33
Turning to the third type of public forum, the limited public forum: The
state often makes space available for expression but in a limited way only.
Sometimes the limit is just on speaker identity, and here we might better
term the space a designated public forum. For example, if a public college
opens auditorium space for students of that college only, that space is
limited in a sense, but not in an interesting sense. More often when forums
are limited they are limited by subject matter or type of expression, or,
perhaps, by viewpoint. The Court’s stated rule for limited public forums is

31. The Court in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), considered a public university’s open
meeting space for its students generally. The Court struck down the university’s exclusion of religious
worship/discussion. See id. at 276–77. It’s not clear whether we should treat the forum as designated or
limited. Widmar becomes the anchor case for a series of limited public forum holdings, which I discuss
below. See infra text accompanying notes 58–75. We could treat the forums in these cases as designated
public forums (although limited to students at the school in question) or as limited public forums
(because the school in each case limited speech by viewpoint or subject matter, depending on how one
sees it). For discussion of the difficulty of determining whether transit ad space is a designated or
limited public forum, see American Freedom Defense Initiative v. King County, 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022–
26 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). If speech platforms were properly
considered designated public forums, the leeway given for reasonable subject-matter restrictions in
limited public forums would disappear. But my focus is on the “no viewpoint restrictions” rule. Because
that rule is the same in designated and limited public forums, my argument for relaxing it would be the
same either way.
32. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (upholding postal service permitting various types of organized
speech activity outside post offices, while denying access for in-person solicitation of funds by political
group) (plurality opinion); Cornelius, 473 U.S. 788 (upholding federal rule permitting various
nonprofits to participate in the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive aimed at federal
employees, while denying participation to legal defense and political advocacy organizations); Perry,
460 U.S. 37 (upholding public school permitting privileged access to interschool mail system and
teachers’ mailboxes to the elected teachers’ union, while denying similar access to rival union); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 831 (1976) (upholding army base permission of various civilian speakers and
clergy onto the base, as well as some theatrical and musical productions, while denying
“[d]emonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, political speeches and similar activities”);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion) (upholding city practice
permitting commercial and public service ads on public transit vehicles, while denying political ads).
33. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 750–51 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 814, 823,
825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); POST, supra note 21, at 224–26; Frederick Schauer, Principles,
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 98–99 & n.74 (1998).
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that content-based restrictions must be reasonable (a highly deferential test)
but may not be based on viewpoint (a sharply restrictive test).34
Perhaps the first example of the Court’s upholding restrictions in a
limited public forum was Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.35 On its public
transit vehicles, the city allowed commercial advertising and ads from
groups promoting public service, but rejected political advertising.36 Five
Justices deemed this space not a traditional or designated public forum
(without using those precise terms).37 Treating the space as what it would
come to call a limited public forum, the plurality deemed the subject-matter
restriction reasonable, the city’s purpose being “to minimize chances of
abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a
captive audience.”38 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Douglas focused
on the captive audience concern.39 Lehman remains one of the clearest
examples of the Court upholding a limited public forum under a highly
deferential reasonableness test, with no viewpoint restriction to worry
about.
The Court has upheld restrictions in limited public forums several
times since. In Greer v. Spock,40 it upheld a U.S. Army base’s decision to
prevent Dr. Benjamin Spock, a presidential candidate, from holding
meetings on the base and from distributing campaign literature. Civilian
passage into and through the base was generally allowed, and entry and exit
were not guarded.41 Some civilians and clergy had been invited to speak on
the base; some theatrical and musical productions had been permitted.42
But “[d]emonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, political
speeches and similar activities” were prohibited, and distribution of any
publication required military approval.43 All of this would be
unconstitutional for regulation of private speech, or in a traditional or
34. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07
(2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392–93 (1993); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry,
460 U.S. at 46; see also POST, supra note 21, at 260; Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When
Speech is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 625 (2008).
35. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion).
36. The policy denied all political advertising, and although a political campaign ad was at issue
in the case, the policy would reject political issue ads as well, as Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent.
Id. at 317–18 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. See id. at 299, 301–02 (plurality opinion); id. at 305–08 (Douglas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
38. Id. at 304 (plurality opinion).
39. See id. at 307–08 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
40. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
41. Id. at 830.
42. Id. at 831.
43. Id.
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designated public forum. But, deeming this space a limited public forum
(though not using that term), the Court deferred on the ground that the
military wanted to remain and appear neutral regarding partisan politics.44
This is a concern with misattribution, similar to Lehman’s concern with
“appearance of favoritism.”45 The case did not involve a viewpoint
restriction (or at least was not decided that way; perhaps the exclusion
decision was based on dislike for Spock’s left-wing views).
In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,46 a public
school gave the elected teachers’ union privileged access to the interschool
mail system and teachers’ mailboxes, excluding the rival teachers’ union
(except during union representation elections). The school also granted
access to the mailboxes to some outside users (such as the Cub Scouts).47
The Court upheld the exclusion of the rival teachers’ union, deeming the
relevant space nonpublic and the exclusion reasonable given that one union
had won the election and was representing the teachers and the other had
lost and was not.48 The Court refused to see this distinction as viewpoint
based.49
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.50 involved
a forum of the subsidy type, as opposed to the more standard physical
space forum. The Combined Federal Campaign is a charity drive aimed at
federal employees. It permitted fundraising from various nonprofits, but
excluded legal defense and political advocacy organizations.51 Deeming the
forum nonpublic, the Court held the exclusion to satisfy the reasonableness
standard, because the government might determine that the included groups
are in greater need of the funds and to avoid appearance of favoritism.52 We
have seen that latter reason before—in Lehman and in Greer—and I will
say more about it later when discussing misattribution. No viewpoint
restriction was involved here (although the matter was remanded to
consider an allegation of viewpoint bias).53
The most recent case to uphold restrictions in a limited public forum is
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 839.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
See id. at 47.
See id. at 46–54.
See id. at 49.
473 U.S. 788 (1985).
See id. at 790.
See id. at 809.
See id. at 812–13.
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College of the Law v. Martinez.54 Hastings Law School (a state school)
insisted that for a student group to get “official recognition” and “attendant
use of school funds and facilities” the group had to make membership and
leadership opportunities available to all students.55 When the Christian
Legal Society couldn’t comply because of its policies relating to gay and
lesbian sexuality, it was cut off from much of what student groups
otherwise get from the school (although the school granted it meeting space
and access to some school communications).56 Deeming the package of
money and space subsidies for eligible student groups a limited public
forum, the Court upheld Hastings’ policy as reasonable and not viewpoint
based.57
The Court has four times invalidated a restriction in a limited public
forum, each time deeming the restriction impermissibly viewpoint based
against religious speech. There are several points to make in describing
these cases: it’s not clear whether these forums should be described as
designated or limited public forums, but that doesn’t matter for purposes of
this Article; the Court may have been mistaken in deeming the restrictions
viewpoint based rather than subject-matter based, and arguably that could
have affected the outcome of the cases, but that is specific to religionclause analysis and again doesn’t hit the center of my argument; the failure
of the state’s justification in each case turned on an erroneous attribution
argument, and this will come in handy when we turn to the misattribution
concern at the heart of the debate over cases such as Walker; finally, that
the viewpoint-based invalidations in the limited public forum setting came
in religious speech cases, in part in response to the erroneous attribution
claims of the state, and that the other mentions of the no-viewpointrestrictions rule in limited public forums appeared in dicta, will help my
argument for rethinking the apparently categorical rule against viewpointbased restrictions in limited public forums (and pave the way to a new
understanding of the many speech platforms the state sets up).

54. 561 U.S. 661 (2010). Three other cases are worth mentioning. In Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267–70 (1988), the Court deemed a newspaper produced as part of a high
school journalism class a nonpublic forum (probably better to see that under the “government as
educator” heading). In United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion), along
with holding a U.S. Post Office sidewalk not a traditional public forum, the Court held that opening the
space to some speakers did not turn it into a designated public forum. In Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998), the Court deemed a public television
station’s candidate debate a nonpublic forum.
55. Martinez, 561 U.S. at 668.
56. See id. at 672–73.
57. Id. at 682, 697.
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The seminal case in this line—although not the most fully analyzed by
the Court—is Widmar v. Vincent.58 A public university made its facilities
generally available for student groups to meet, but excluded a group from
engaging in religious worship and discussion. The Court ruled in favor of
the excluded group, reasoning that once the university opened its space for
student speech activity, its content-based exclusion was subject to strict
scrutiny, which it could not meet.59 The Court rejected the university’s
argument that the exclusion was necessary to avoid an Establishment
Clause problem; because the space was available to a wide array of student
groups, permitting the religious group access would not place the state’s
imprimatur on religion.60 The Court didn’t specify that the exclusion was
viewpoint based, although Justice Stevens did in a separate opinion.61 And
the Court didn’t specify whether the meeting spaces were a designated
public forum subject to normal free speech rules or a limited public forum
subject to a reasonableness and no viewpoint restriction rule. Either way
the exclusion would be invalid if seen as a bar on religious viewpoints.
Perhaps that’s the right way to see it. One could argue, though, that the
restriction is subject matter rather than viewpoint based, the excluded
subject matter being religion. If that’s the right way to see it, it would be
invalid in a designated public forum (subject-matter restrictions generally
flunk strict scrutiny), but would be subject to the weaker reasonableness
test in a limited public forum (as was the case in Lehman, Greer, and
Cornelius). One might contend that the exclusion of religious subject
matter is unreasonable, and that might be right, especially if the only
argument in its favor is to avoid an Establishment Clause violation, for the
Court was right to say that when space is open to a wide array of speakers,
it’s a mistake to attribute any of the speech to the state. However, if
reasonableness is the test, arguably the state has an interest—pursuant to
what we might call Establishment Clause values rather than an
Establishment Clause rule—in avoiding possible association with or
advancement of religious doctrine. This point was key to Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Locke v. Davey,62 upholding the
exclusion of devotional theology from a state scholarship program, even
though the Establishment Clause didn’t require such exclusion. Although
this is interesting material, we can put it aside now, and focus on the central
points from Widmar: the invalidation of what is arguably a viewpoint

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Id. at 270, 277.
See id. at 274–75.
See id. at 280 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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restriction on religious speech in what is arguably a limited public forum,
accomplished by casting aside an erroneous misattribution claim.
By the time the next case in this line was decided, the Court had firmed
up its public forum categories (traditional, designated, and limited or
nonpublic) and its rule for the latter (reasonableness test plus no viewpoint
restrictions). Thus, the correct outcome in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District was fairly clear.63 The school district
opened public school classroom space for various after-school activities by
student and community groups, but denied the space for religious
purposes.64 In this case, the district rejected the space for use by a religious
group for expression on child-rearing and family values.65 The Court said it
didn’t have to decide whether the space was a designated or nonpublic
forum.66 Even if the more deferential rules of the latter apply, the restriction
was impermissibly viewpoint based, not rescued by an erroneous
Establishment Clause attribution argument.67
The third of the viewpoint-discrimination/limited public forum cases is
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.68 It’s a
tricky case for several reasons, but if one accepts the predicates the Court
accepted, it fits with Widmar and Lamb’s Chapel. The University of
Virginia exacted fees from its students to pay for various activities,
including publications, but it barred such fees for religious, philanthropic,
and political publications.69 The Court held that Virginia had opened a
limited public forum (of the funding rather than physical space variety),
and that the restriction on religious speech was impermissibly viewpoint
based.70 An Establishment Clause argument could not rescue the day
because the funded speech was not that of the state, nor would it be proper
to attribute or associate the speech with the state.71 So far, this is in line
with Widmar and Lamb’s Chapel. What makes Rosenberger harder is that
the state arguably wanted to avoid funding controversy through exacted
fees (the religious and political speech bars), and that makes the case look
like Lehman, Greer, and Cornelius. Those cases in part turned on a
problematic misattribution argument, but as I’ll discuss further in Part VI,
they may be seen as upholding as reasonable the government’s wish to not

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

508 U.S. 384 (1993).
See id. at 386–87.
Id. at 387–89.
See id. at 391–92.
See id. at 394–95.
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
Id. at 824–25.
Id. at 828–37.
See id. at 840–42.
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set up a platform, with taxpayer dollars, for potential controversy. These
may not be wise governmental decisions, but they fit with a capacious
government speech/government-as-patron model, in which it’s appropriate
to defer to the state in wanting taxpayer dollars (or exacted student activity
fees) to be used for more mainstream ends. Rosenberger is also hard
because exacted fees used for evangelizing ends (the facts of the case) is
problematic per the early Establishment Clause paradigm of not funding
the ministry (key to Locke v. Davey72). Putting these critiques of
Rosenberger aside, its core is the same as Widmar’s and Lamb’s Chapel’s:
viewpoint restriction of religious speech invalidated in a limited public
forum; Establishment Clause attribution argument properly rejected.
The final case of the quartet is Good News Club v. Milford Central
School,73 in which a public school opened its classrooms for after-school
meetings held by a wide variety of community groups, but not for religious
purposes. Deeming the space a limited public forum, the Court struck down
the policy as unconstitutionally viewpoint discriminatory against religious
speech.74 In the clearest terms of these four cases, the Court rejected
possible misattribution of the religious speech to the state, even if one
focuses on possible error by the schoolchildren themselves (a group one
might think is more prone to make such a mistake).75 If the school must
permit religious along with a wide variety of other speech, then it’s
improper to attribute the religious speech to the state, there’s no
Establishment Clause problem, and the risk of mistake of fact isn’t a proper
ground for holding otherwise.
So how ought we think about limited public forums? What are they?
They are not traditional places for people to assemble to engage in
expressive activity. Although they may be used for that purpose, they don’t
have the same cultural/historical roots as do streets and parks, nor does the
right of assembly fit easily with most limited public forum settings. We can
have the best of both worlds76—a world of relatively unfettered exchange

72. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
73. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
74. Id. at 120.
75. See id. at 112–19.
76. This analysis shares some ground with Robert Post’s theory of dividing territory between
state governance (normal free speech rules apply) and state management (more deference). See POST,
supra note 21; see also Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and
Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953 (1998); Schauer, supra note 33, at 99
(if access not mandatory, “[w]hat is not superfluous is the question whether this is one of the
government enterprises which may control for content or viewpoint, and as to this question public
forum doctrine offers no assistance”). For a fascinating discussion of the difference between
management via government speech or subsidies and governance via coordinating a kind of property
interest, see In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (deeming federal trademark law to be
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of ideas, in which the state opens up space otherwise dedicated for other
purposes (transportation, recreation), and a world in which the government
speech model is the more appropriate analogue, even if the state is not itself
speaking. In the former setting, we appropriately don’t defer to the state’s
claim of purpose, reducing the settings to transportation and recreation or
using those primary purposes to allow plenary or near-plenary state control
of other ends for the space. Because such traditional public forums exist,
with the same protective rules as for regulation of private speech outside of
government-owned property, in the limited public forum setting we can be
more deferential (with limits, to be discussed) to state purpose. That is, we
can see limited public forums as speech platforms that the state erects with
some care, to provide speech opportunities while paying attention to
expression deemed harmful, in which the state itself would not want to
engage and for which it does not want to provide a platform. Moving in this
direction doctrinally would not require a big shift from current Court
holdings. The only viewpoint restriction invalidations in limited public
forums have come in the setting of religious speech, where a misreading of
Establishment Clause attribution animated the restrictions to begin with.
The Widmar quartet of holdings does not ground a broader rule against
viewpoint selectivity in limited public forums, and the rest of the case law
in this area is repeated dicta.
II. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”77
forbids state action that “limits or curtails”78 the expression of persons.
Criminal or civil regulation of expression is subject to a complex body of
Court doctrine determining which laws count as abridgment of the
“freedom of” speech. But government speech is non-regulatory; it doesn’t
impose sanctions on persons. When the state speaks, it’s hard to see how
the freedom of speech is implicated. In several holdings, dicta, and
concurring and dissenting opinions, the Court and its members have said as
much.79
the latter and invalidating on First Amendment grounds the statutory provision that prohibits
registration of disparaging trademarks), cert. granted sub nom., Lee v. Tam, 2016 WL 157871 (2016).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
78. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 6 (5th ed. 2011)
(definition of “abridge”).
79. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245 (2015)
(“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of
what it says.”); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009) (“[P]lacement of a
permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of government speech and is therefore
not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.”); id. at 467–68 (citations omitted) (“The Free
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Furthermore, government speech has several virtues.80 It is needed to
execute laws and regulations. A legislator or executive officer might give a
speech outlining a new law; an agency might issue guidance on how a law
or regulation is to be understood or enforced. Some state speech fills gaps
in the marketplace of ideas, supplementing private speech that might be
skewed toward profit or other not publicly regarding ends. Consider
government agency provision of information regarding the environment, or
public health. Governmental actors or entities might reach conclusions
about matters of public concern that ought to be shared just as anyone’s
ideas ought to be shared—because perhaps we have a duty to share with
others what we believe to be true or good. The state may have distinctive
views and an obligation as fiduciary to say what it believes to be true. Its
speech may be distinctive in various ways, providing points of view not
otherwise available, or aggregating views of different persons or providing
a centralized perspective.
The virtues of government speech are not diminished in settings of
public controversy.81 Many issues on which the government speaks—either
through elected officials, appointed agency personnel, or hired
contractors—will be contested, with the state’s position being not only one
among many but also subject to sharp disagreement. Although the state
Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government
speech. A government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself.’ ‘[I]t is entitled to say what it wishes,’ and
to select the views that it wants to express.”); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559
(2005) (“‘Compelled support of government’ . . . is of course perfectly constitutional . . . . And some
government programs involve, or entirely consist of, advocating a position.”); Nat’l Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (“[A]lthough the First Amendment certainly has
application in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may allocate competitive funding
according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty
at stake.”); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (distinguishing compelled support of private speech from compelled support for government;
regarding the latter, “a local school board does not need to demonstrate a compelling state interest every
time it spends a taxpayer’s money in ways the taxpayer finds abhorrent”); see also Schauer, supra note
33, at 95–96. For general support of the distinction between the state’s expressive and coercive
capacities, see COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT SAY? HOW
DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY (2012).
80. See Greene, supra note 18, at 8–10. For elaboration of my views on state speech, see Abner
S. Greene, State Speech and Political Liberalism, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 421 (2013); Abner S. Greene,
Government Endorsement: A Reply to Nelson Tebbe’s Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV.
HEADNOTES 87 (2013); Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1667 (2001).
81. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 (content-based considerations necessary for public arts funding);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without
at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way.”); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 572 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[I]f it is
the desire of the citizens of Chattanooga, who presumably have paid for and own the facilities, that the
attractions to be shown there should not be of the kind which would offend any substantial number of
potential theatergoers, I do not think the policy can be described as arbitrary or unreasonable.”).
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often may have an important role to play in less controversial areas—
perhaps where science or health is involved (although even here we see
contest)—that doesn’t exhaust the contribution state actors may make.
Opposition comes from those who believe the state should stay out of
ideas promotion entirely (no public schools, no publicly funded art, etc.), or
from those who say the state may do so only by providing seed money for
private speech. These theories may be based in a particular understanding
of government neutrality toward conceptions of the good, or a halfway
position supporting what we might call a thin perfectionism, whereas my
stronger support for state speech might be dubbed thick perfectionism. I
have defended that view elsewhere,82 and it is one predicate for this Article:
the state has a legitimate, constitutional, and important role to play in
advancing conceptions of the good.
There are three ways in which government speech might run afoul of
the Free Speech Clause or push the edge of it. First, apparently
nonregulatory state speech might become or be considered coercive.83 We
should not, though, assume state speech will overwhelm the public or be
given too much weight.84 Free speech doctrine assumes people can assess
arguments, accounting for speaker identity, and weigh them accordingly.
The Court has, though, expressed concern with “leveraging,” i.e., when the
state attaches conditions to government funds to advance a government
message, in a way not reasonably enough connected to the purposes of the
government program.85 The principal conceptual difficulty with the antileveraging rule is that government generally has broad discretion in
defining its programs and appropriate speech appurtenant to its programs.86
For example, Congress may establish a National Endowment for

82. See Greene, supra note 18, at 18–26; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 147 (“Liberal
government cannot help but be partisan . . . .”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 89–90 (1990).
83. See Greene, supra note 18, at 41–49.
84. See id. at 45; see also Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 373, 377 (1983) (“People are not simply brainwashed by the state, but very often exercise choice
and reach conclusions contrary to those that the government desires.”).
85. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2328
(2013) (noting a problem if conditions “seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours
of the program itself”); Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (“If the NEA were to leverage its power to award
subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would
confront a different case.”); Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (“[O]ur ‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve
situations in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on
a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected
conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.”); see also Schauer, supra note 33, at 103
(unconstitutional conditions doctrine in this setting “serves well enough for conditions unrelated to the
program at issue”).
86. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (“[W]hen the Government appropriates public funds to establish a
program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”).
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Democracy and authorize speech and publications promoting a certain
conception of our constitutional order, forbidding in that program
advancement of competing ideas (such as communism).87 The hard
questions are whether there are Free Speech Clause limits to how such
programs may be defined and whether the state may change the nature of a
program once it’s established, excluding more speech than previously
excluded.88 There is no natural way of understanding the proper scope of a
government program, and thus the baseline against which we determine
when inappropriate leveraging has occurred may frequently be contested.
Second, if the state were to monopolize a market for a certain type of
speech, the virtues of the state as offering just one point of view in a public
debate would diminish or be eliminated.89 If this happens, but without
coercion, it’s hard to say it abridges the freedom of speech. Perhaps
monopolization in this setting is more a policy or political theoretic
concern, and less one of constitutional magnitude.
Finally, the state should be transparent about its role in speech acts.90
Often this is not a problem; when a state official or agency speaks or issues
a publication, it’s clearly the view of the official or the agency. But when
the state hires someone to speak for it, or is part of a public-private speech
act, things can get murky. The concern here is with ventriloquism, i.e., that
the public might hear a message and attribute it to the dummy, as it were,
ignorant of the true speaker. This can implicate the right against compelled
speech. The Court has adopted a strong reading of the Free Speech Clause
in this regard—one has a right against being compelled to utter the state’s
or another person’s message, and in some settings not to be compelled to
use one’s property to foster the state’s or another person’s message.91

87. See id.
88. See Greene, supra note 18, at 52–67; see also Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The
Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1407 (2001) (a tough unanswered question
is when the Court will see the government as having changed from setting up an opportunity for private
speech to speaking itself).
89. See Greene, supra note 18, at 27–40; see also Schauer, supra note 84, at 380. There might be
some tension between this concern and my point in note 6, supra, that state-provided speech platforms
may serve a distinctive niche in the speech market. But there’s a lot of room between offering
something distinctive and becoming a monopolist.
90. See Greene, supra note 18, at 49–52; see also Bezanson & Buss, supra note 88, at 1384,
1431; Corbin, supra note 34, at 664; Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? Disentangling Government
and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 56–57 (2002); Gia B. Lee, Persuasion,
Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983 (2005); Helen Norton, The Measure of
Government Speech: Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 596, 599 (2008)
[hereinafter Norton, Measure]; Helen Norton, Not For Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting
the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2004) [hereinafter Norton, Not
for Attribution].
91. See Greene, (Mis)Attribution, supra note 7, at 839–44; Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of
Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995).
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Although there is no First Amendment right against being compelled to
fund state speech (e.g., tax dollars supporting the Department of
Agriculture’s “Beef. It’s What’s for Dinner” ads),92 if the government is
working in partnership with beef producers and viewers would reasonably
attribute the ads to the beef producers, the producers might now have a
claim sounding in the right against compelled speech.93 And although the
Court didn’t so hold, the doctors who were subject to the abortion
counseling gag rule, and thus required to mouth the government’s and not
their own views about abortion as an option, might have had a free speech
claim.94
Any misattribution claim from state speech that masks the
governmental source would be a claim of the private person. In the limited
public forum setting, the Court and commentators sometimes maintain that
the state has a right (or interest) to avoid private speech being misattributed
to it. This concern is used to support more leeway for government contentbased choices, either by defending such choices in a limited public forum,
or by reconceptualizing the matter as government speech rather than
limited public forum regulation. I will explore in Part IV whether the state
has a legitimate interest in avoiding this kind of misattribution, if it really is
occurring, and how answering these questions helps us better understand
what’s at stake with state provision of speech opportunities for others.
Apart from a possible free speech claim by a private person stemming
from government speech ventriloquism, there are sound arguments of
constitutional structure and liberal political theory backing a transparency
condition for state speech.95 Such speech is valuable and justifiable as the
speech of the state, in the ways it contributes to public debate. For this
value to obtain, we must know it’s the state speaking; this helps us evaluate
the message and enables us to throw the bastards out if we don’t like what

92. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 554 (2005).
93. See id. at 565–67; id. at 577–79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
94. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
95. This condition can sometimes be met by appropriate claimers or disclaimers. For cases
discussing such, see Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564–65, 577–79 (debating whether government properly
claimed speech as its own); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 784 (1995)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (possibility that state could disclaim KKK cross as
not state speech); id. at 817–18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (insufficient disclaimer); Rust, 500 U.S. at
200, 214, 217 (1991) (debating whether government properly claimed speech as its own); see also
Bezanson & Buss, supra note 88, at 1432 (government disclaimer can kick matter out of government
speech category); id. at 1483 (disclaimers can help in various settings); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Free
Speech and the Limits of Legislative Discretion: The Example of Specialty License Plates, 53 FLA. L.
REV. 419, 452 (2001) (important for government to “acknowledge a government agent’s speech as its
own”); Jacobs, supra note 90, at 57–60 (no government speech if state disclaims the speech); Norton,
Not for Attribution, supra note 90, at 1339 (importance of government disclaimers in some settings).
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they’re saying. The absence of transparency wouldn’t give rise to a free
speech claim, but rather to sound criticism of the masking.
It’s possible for state speech to run afoul of constitutional provisions
other than the Free Speech Clause. The Court has three times held that
state-sponsored religious displays violate the Establishment Clause.96 And
although there are no cases so holding, there’s a good argument that state
speech could violate the Equal Protection Clause, for example, if a town
pronounced itself the “White Persons Only” refuge or made similar clear,
purposive, derogatory proclamations based on race or other suspect or
otherwise protected characteristics.97
For the most part, though, government speech does not run afoul of the
coercion, monopolization,98 or ventriloquism problems, and does not
implicate the Establishment Clause or Equal Protection Clause. Rather, it is
playing a role in public debate, helping advance a sometimes contested
view of the good. The Court has made clear that such viewpoint selectivity
in government speech is acceptable.99 In such settings, the state chooses
what to say and we properly attribute the speech to it.100 When the state
opens space for private speech—say, a new town park with a performance
bandshell—it operates on the other end of the spectrum from the
government speech model and is properly limited by normal free speech

96. See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (county display of Ten Commandments at
courthouse violates Establishment Clause); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (county
display of crèche on grand staircase of county courthouse violates Establishment Clause); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (posting of Ten Commandments on public school classroom
walls violates Establishment Clause); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468
(2009) (Establishment Clause limit on government speech); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 777, 799, 817
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment; Stevens, J., dissenting; Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(majority of Justices would find Establishment Clause violation if reasonable observer would deem
private religious display on government property endorsement by the state).
97. See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 651, 658–68
(2013).
98. See Schauer, supra note 84, at 377, 381.
99. See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (2015)
(“[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a
policy, or to take a position.”); Summum, 555 U.S. at 468 (government is entitled to “select the views
that it wants to express”); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (citation omitted)
(“[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which the government is itself
the speaker, or instances . . . in which the government ‘used private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program.’”) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)); see also Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment does not mandate a
viewpoint-neutral government. . . . [T]he government may enlist the assistance of those who believe in
its ideas to carry them to fruition; and it need not enlist for that purpose those who oppose or do not
support the ideas.”).
100. See Bezanson & Buss, supra note 88, at 1384 (“[G]overnment speech should be limited to
purposeful action by government, expressing its own distinct message, which is understood by those
who receive it to be the government’s message.”).
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rules.101 But it is the in-between case that interests me here: when the state
sets up a forum for certain speech only, with limits that track the state’s
interest in promoting some notions of the good and avoiding promotion of
other notions. Those settings—sometimes deemed limited public forums—
sit uneasily between the normal free speech rules that apply in traditional
public forums and the fairly open territory for the state’s own speech. As I
will argue below, we should borrow from government speech doctrine in
allowing some leeway in how states set up limited public forums. To make
clear that this would involve a doctrinal shift, and to achieve a more
accurate branding, we should call these settings “speech platforms.”
III. WALKER
If you own a motor vehicle in Texas, you may choose a standard
license plate, a “vanity” license plate with letters and numbers you select
(subject to restrictions),102 or one of many specialty license plates either
created by the state legislature or approved by the Texas Department of
Motor Vehicles Board (the Board).103 TEXAS appears atop every plate.104
The Sons of Confederate Veterans, Texas Division (SCV), proposed a
specialty plate that would include the image of a rectangular Confederate
battle flag on the left side, with the identifying numbers and letters in the
middle and right side. The words “Sons of Confederate Veterans” would
appear around the flag, and also at the bottom of the plate.105 More than
350 specialty plate messages have been approved106 (via a few different
administrative methods), but the Board denied the SCV application
pursuant to a statutory provision that permits rejection “if the design might

101. For the Court’s expression of this distinction between the broad latitude given to
government speech and the normal rules applicable in traditional or designated public forums, see
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819. The Court observed that in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), it
allowed the government to expend funds to promote its own message and not an opposing message, and
that there’s dicta in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) giving public universities the power to
make content-based academic decisions. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. The Court continued:
It does not follow, however, and we did not suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based
restrictions are proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a
message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers. A holding that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of
private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech,
which is controlled by different principles.
Id. at 834.
102. See 43 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 217.45(c)(7) (2015).
103. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2244–45.
104. See id. at 2248.
105. Id. at 2245.
106. See id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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be offensive to any member of the public.”107 The Board concluded that
“public comments ha[d] shown that many members of the general public
find the design offensive, and . . . such comments are reasonable.”108
In an unusual voting arrangement—Justice Thomas joining the four
“liberal” Justices—the Court held the specialty plate denial
constitutional.109 There were only two opinions—Justice Breyer for the
majority and Justice Alito for the dissent. The majority didn’t dispute
Justice Alito’s conclusion that the denial represented “blatant viewpoint
discrimination.”110 As far as one can tell, all nine Justices thought they had
two choices—deem the specialty plate messages government speech, thus
permitting the state to reject the Confederate flag design because of the
offensive, disfavored viewpoint; or deem the specialty plate program a
limited public forum, established by the state for private speech, and hold
the denial unconstitutional, because viewpoint restrictions in such a forum
are invalid. No Justice tried to create a new category of “mixed speech”;
none criticized the no-viewpoint-restrictions rule in limited public forums.
Doctrine exerted a powerful pull—valid government speech or
unconstitutional viewpoint denial in a limited public forum appear to be the
only two options the Justices considered.
The majority structured its discussion around the analysis from
Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum.111 In Summum, the Court
unanimously deemed a city’s choice of permanent monuments for its
public park to be government speech, not subject to First Amendment Free
Speech Clause restrictions, even though the monuments were mostly
donated by private groups or individuals.112 Justice Alito’s majority opinion
reasoned that property owners don’t usually install monuments with which
they don’t want to be associated and that observers generally believe
monuments convey messages for the property owners.113 “The monuments
that are accepted . . . are meant to convey and have the effect of conveying
a government message, and they thus constitute government speech.”114

107. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 504.801(c) (West 2013 & Supp. 2016); Walker, 135 S. Ct. at
2245.
108. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2245 (alteration in original).
109. Id. at 2244. For scholarship presaging this result, see Norton, Measure, supra note 90, at
618–22; Norton, Not for Attribution, supra note 90, at 1342–43.
110. 135 S. Ct. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2251 (majority opinion) (alteration
in original) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009)) (state may “exercise
[its] freedom to express its views”).
111. 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
112. See id. at 464.
113. See id. at 471.
114. Id. at 472.
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Justice Breyer relied on Summum to make three points. First, states
have long used license plates to convey messages.115 Second, “Texas
license plate designs ‘are often closely identified in the public mind with
the [State].’”116 The word TEXAS appears on all the plates; the state
requires car owners to display plates on their cars; the state issues the
plates, owns all plate designs, and dictates how plates may be disposed.117
“Texas license plates are, essentially, government IDs,”118 and issuers of
IDs don’t usually permit messages on the IDs with which they don’t wish
to be associated.119 “Consequently, ‘persons who observe’ designs on IDs
‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on
the [issuer’s] behalf.’”120 Moreover, because car owners could affix their
own bumper stickers, perhaps they want specialty plates to convey
government endorsement of the messages on such plates.121 Third, “Texas
maintains direct control over the messages conveyed on its specialty
plates. . . . This final approval authority allows Texas to choose how to
present itself and its constituency.”122
Finally, Justice Breyer rejected the argument that Texas has established
some kind of public forum subject to a rule against viewpoint restrictions.
First, he explained that this isn’t a designated public forum.123 He restated
that Texas maintains final authority over specialty plate designs, that it
owns the designs, that plates have often been used for government speech,
and that as a form of government ID they bear the state’s name.124 “These
features of Texas license plates indicate that Texas explicitly associates
itself with the speech on its plates.”125 Second, he explained that this isn’t a
nonpublic forum.126 He distinguished Perry, Lehman, and Cornelius by
showing that in each case private persons were speaking, and not the
state.127 The Court decided each of those cases in favor of the government,
so Breyer wasn’t distinguishing them because of their holdings; the

115. See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2248.
116. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 472).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2249.
119. Id.
120. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2250. He also briefly discussed traditional public forums, but no one had argued the
specialty plates are such a forum. Id. He also rejected the argument that this is a “limited public forum,”
id., which he used to refer to a designated public forum for certain groups or topics.
124. Id. at 2251.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 2252.
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concern was that their dicta says “no viewpoint restrictions even in
nonpublic forums,” and Breyer was cordoning them off for that reason.
Justice Alito’s dissent was straightforward.128 Although government
speech is present on part of the plates, “the State of Texas has converted the
remaining space on its specialty plates into little mobile billboards on
which motorists can display their own messages.”129 As the author of
Summum, Alito then took issue with the majority’s reliance on Summum.
He made three points. First, although there is a tradition of government
using permanent monuments to express a message, there’s no such tradition
regarding the over 350 specialty plate messages Texas has permitted; at
some point in the last 20 years, it moved from using the plates to promote
state programs to allowing “private entities to secure plates conveying their
own messages.”130 Second, although property owners generally don’t
permit permanent monuments to express messages with which the owners
disagree, Texas starts from a different baseline with its specialty plates
program: “it proclaims that it is open to all private messages—except those,
like the SCV plate, that would offend some who viewed them.”131 That
people might want a state seal of approval through specialty plates argues
not for the plates being state speech, maintained Alito, but rather for seeing
specialty plates as “governmental blessing (or condemnation) of private
speech.”132 Third, although permanent monuments in public parks are
limited in number, there are a limitless number of possible specialty plate
designs.133 Alito concluded:
What Texas has done by selling space on its license plates is to
create what we have called a limited public forum. It has allowed
state property (i.e., motor vehicle license plates) to be used by
private speakers according to rules that the State prescribes. Under
the First Amendment, however, those rules cannot discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint. But that is exactly what Texas did here.134
The majority, understandably, was squeamish about insisting that states
open specialty plates to all viewpoints. Whether the Confederate flag
represents racism or is a symbol of a certain heritage may be debated, but
about plenty of other symbols or words there would be no doubt. Consider
128. For scholarship anticipating Alito’s position, see Corbin, supra note 34, at 684; Jacobs,
supra note 95, at 423, 453–54, 461; Jacobs, supra note 90, at 98.
129. 135 S. Ct. at 2256 (Alito, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2260.
131. Id. at 2261.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2262 (citations omitted).
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your own favorite (i.e., least liked) epithet based on race, ethnicity,
religion, gender, or sexual orientation. If the state must permit the
Confederate flag as a specialty plate, it must permit every viewpoint, no
matter how odious. In an effort to avoid this outcome, though, Justice
Breyer made three mistakes.135 The first is the most obvious, and Alito
nailed it: It’s one thing for us to see TEXAS as state speech; it’s another to
say a plethora of private designs are state speech. Throughout his opinion,
Breyer moved from the former to the latter, without much of an
argument.136 Second, that the Texas Board exerts control over the specialty
plate messages doesn’t help resolve the question in the case—whether the
resulting messages are state or private speech. Thus, while Breyer wrote
“this final approval authority allows Texas to choose how to present itself
and its constituency,”137 we still must determine whether the “itself” is
“state as speaker” or “state as granter/denier of private speech
opportunities.” The latter as well as the former represents something about
the state’s values, but approving or disapproving someone else’s speech is
not the same as speaking oneself. Third, Breyer ran into similar difficulties
with his point about association/endorsement, i.e., attribution. He moved
from a point with which I agree—issuers of IDs don’t permit messages on
the IDs “with which they do not wish to be associated”138—to the key
conclusion that observers of such messages “interpret them as conveying
some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.”139 The state may be associated with
a message it permits on the plates in two different ways: as speaker or as
authorizer of someone else’s speech. Either way there is an association
with the state; if a state citizen doesn’t like the message, in the former
instance one should say “state, stop advancing this idea as yours (i.e.,
ours),” but in the latter instance one should say “state, stop giving others an
opportunity to advance this message.” Because there are two ways in which
the state may be associated with a message in this setting, one can’t simply
conclude, as Breyer did, that those who see specialty plates assume the
messages are conveying state speech. Although I suppose this is ultimately

135. My critique here is a change from a briefly stated view in Greene, (Mis)Attribution, supra
note 7, at 849.
136. See 135 S. Ct. at 2248 (moving from examples of graphics and slogans that are clearly the
state’s speech to concluding that all messages on specialty plates are); id. (moving from TEXAS and the
numbers on a license plate to the specialty plate designs when arguing that the public identifies all that’s
on license plates with the state); id. at 2250 (fact of plate being government-issued ID with the word
TEXAS argues for the specialty plates as a whole being state speech); id. at 2251 (moving from Texas
license plates traditionally being used for government speech, used as a form of government ID, and
bearing the state’s name, to conclusion that the specialty plate messages are state speech).
137. Id. at 2249.
138. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 471 (2009)).
139. Id. (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471).
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an empirical question (about which neither Breyer nor Alito offers any
evidence), Alito’s take on this seems more plausible: the average viewer of
the many specialty plate messages would assume that the state has
permitted the speech, thus helping to convey the car owner’s message, and
thus that the state is associated with the speech in this way.140 But not as
speaker itself.
So it’s hard to say that the SCV’s Confederate flag, were it part of a
specialty plate message, would best be understood as speech of the state of
Texas, i.e., as the state advancing whatever message the Confederate flag
advances. But is there a way, consistent with the best understanding of the
First Amendment, to avoid the opposite outcome—specialty plates open to
any odious hateful vitriolic message a car owner desires? Some scholars,
also uneasy with the choice between the government speech and limited
public forum models, have advanced a “mixed speech” idea. They claim
that some speech is best seen as both the state’s and a private person’s and
that doctrine needs a mix of the deference we give to government speech,
the measured deference we apply in limited public forums, and the mostly
hands-off approach we insist on for traditional and designated public
forums. These scholars suggest that some version of intermediate scrutiny
is best. I agree that in some settings the state and private persons are
speaking jointly, and those cases present some tricky problems. But the
mixed speech idea doesn’t properly capture what’s going on in settings
such as specialty or vanity license plates, transit ads, and after-school
classroom usage. Before turning to an elucidation and critique of the mixed
speech idea in Part V, first it’s important, in Part IV, to explore the oftexpressed concern that there’s a misattribution problem in these settings,
i.e., that the state’s provision of speech opportunities might lead viewers to
believe erroneously that the state has endorsed the resulting messages. This
concern buttresses arguments for more state control either as a predicate for
concluding the speech is that of the state or as a ground for giving the state
significant content-based authority in limited public forums. It’s usually
wrong, though, to reach the former conclusion, and although I agree many
of these settings are limited public forums, the misattribution grounding for
that conclusion is usually wrong and a distraction from understanding the
settings for what they are—state-provided platforms for private speech.
This discussion of misattribution will aid in critiquing the mixed speech
idea, which relies in part on mistaken conclusions about attribution, and
also help lay the groundwork for the speech platforms concept in Part VI.

140. See id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).

1 GREENE - SPEECH PLATFORM - 337-394 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

The Concept of the Speech Platform

12/5/2016 12:45 PM

365

IV. (MIS)ATTRIBUTION
In several cases, the Court has focused on government’s interest in not
wanting to be perceived as endorsing certain messages. This concern with
unwanted attribution has contributed to two different but related doctrinal
outcomes. Sometimes it helps the Court conclude that the speech is that of
the government and thus that broad content-based discretion is appropriate.
Other times it helps the Court conclude that the government has made a
reasonable content-based (but not viewpoint-based) judgment of inclusion
and exclusion in a limited public forum. First I will show where and how
this happens in the case law and how some scholars have supported it. Next
I will contend that the concern is often misplaced, that there is usually not a
reasonable concern with unwanted attribution of expression to the state. To
the extent there is a misattribution concern, it’s not clear the state may rely
on that to make otherwise constitutionally forbidden speech content
restrictions.141 Even though private persons probably have a
constitutionally based interest in avoiding misattribution (and avoiding
having to speak to dispel misattribution), the state isn’t a rights bearer in
this way. (Although the state has a legitimate interest in avoiding violating
the Constitution via its own expression, it’s not clear if this interest extends
to instances of mistaken attribution to the state.) In any event, in some
settings the state can cure the problem with appropriate disclaimers. Finally
I will contend there still might be a good reason to allow content (and even
viewpoint) restrictions when the state provides speech opportunities, but
not because of a concern with misattribution. Rather, it’s because we
should understand the First Amendment as permitting the state to make
some viewpoint-based and some subject-matter-based restrictions in
limited public forums, either to avoid fostering odious or vulgar speech or
to foster speech while avoiding controversy. This sets the stage for the
speech platforms concept fleshed out in Part VI.
As discussed in Part III, in Summum and Walker the Court grounded its
government speech holdings partly in the state interest in avoiding
unwanted attribution. In Summum, Justice Alito reasoned that property
owners don’t generally “open up their property for the installation of
permanent monuments that convey a message with which they do not wish
to be associated.”142 Because of that, “persons who observe donated
monuments routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as conveying some
141. Throughout this Part, I discuss both attribution and misattribution. When speech is properly
deemed that of the state, virtually complete deference is due, even to viewpoint-based choices, as per
the discussion in Part II. But most of what I cover involves the state wishing to avoid misattribution to it
of what is in fact private speech in a state-created speech platform.
142. 555 U.S. at 471.
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message on the property owner’s behalf.”143 In Walker, Justice Breyer,
relying on Summum (much to Justice Alito’s chagrin!), maintained that
states usually don’t allow placement on government IDs of “message[s]
with which they do not wish to be associated.”144 Because of that, people
who see license plates with specialty designs “routinely—and reasonably—
interpret them as conveying some message on the [issuer’s] behalf.”145
These attribution concerns, and resulting determinations that the speech is
the state’s, permit not only subject matter-based content decisions but also
viewpoint-based content decisions. This is critical to the holding in Walker;
it was less clear in Summum that viewpoint-based speech selection was
occurring.
As discussed in Part I, in a trio of limited public forum cases the Court
deferred to the government’s subject-matter-based speech restrictions in
part because of the endorsement/attribution concern. Thus, it upheld a
city’s exclusion of political advertising from its public transit vehicles,
citing “lurking doubts about favoritism” otherwise.146 It validated the
Army’s refusal to allow political speeches on its Fort Dix, New Jersey base
to ensure that the “the military as such is insulated from both the reality and
the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or
candidates.”147 And it permitted the federal government to host a charity
drive for its employees while excluding legal defense and political
advocacy organizations to “avoid[] the appearance of political
favoritism.”148
Several scholars have supported the Court’s concern with people
attributing speech in state-created speech settings to the state itself. Citing
to the SCV’s specialty license plate, Helen Norton explains that “[p]ublic
entities increasingly maintain that the First Amendment permits them to
ensure that private speakers’ views are not mistakenly attributed to the
government.”149 In this setting and others, “government has a significant
interest in protecting the integrity of its own expression—i.e., in ensuring
143. Id.
144. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249 (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471).
145. Id. (quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471).
146. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion); see also
id. (holding limited access okay to “minimize . . . the appearance of favoritism”).
147. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); see also id. at 846 (Powell, J., concurring)
(asserting that policy furthers “both the appearance and the reality of political neutrality on the part of
the military”).
148. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985) (citing Greer,
424 U.S. at 839; Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
271 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)) (holding that “a
school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a school play ‘disassociate
itself’” from speech deemed inappropriate for the audience).
149. Norton, Not for Attribution, supra note 90, at 1318.
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that its own views and messages are not distorted by others.”150 It’s
important to distinguish, Norton argues, between improper state censorship
and “a sincere and reasonable concern that others’ speech will be
mistakenly understood as the government’s own.”151 After discussing some
factors to consider in making this distinction, Norton concludes that the
state may protect against misattribution by making viewpoint-based
judgments in the specialty-plates setting and that this is state speech.152 To
the contrary, she concludes that we should apply limited public forum
analysis in the setting of public transit ads.153
Caroline Mala Corbin has advanced a conception of mixed speech.154 I
will discuss this more in Part V, but for now consider Corbin’s support for
the (mis)attribution concern. Focusing on specialty plates, she maintains
that “the government may be seen as approving views it does not condone,”
that it “will likely be viewed as endorsing or, at a minimum, tolerating [the
specialty plate] messages.”155 We should not force the state to “associate
itself with messages that it would not voluntarily endorse or tolerate,”156
she claims. The concern with approving or endorsing a message is
different, though, from whether the state is seen as tolerating a message—
the latter is true when we disallow state regulation of speech based on, say,
offensiveness (consider “Fuck the Draft” in Cohen157 or flag burning in
Johnson158), as well as when the state opens space for private speech in
traditional or limited public forums. In these settings as well as in our
private lives, tolerating another’s speech indicates nothing about our
support or nonsupport for the ideas contained therein. It takes something
more to reach approval or endorsement. “Associating” speech with the state
falls somewhere in between the concerns of approval/endorsement and the
different matter of toleration; one might associate speech with the state
when one concludes it’s the state’s own point of view, or one might
associate speech with the state when the state is merely providing a
platform for private speech. To keep matters sharp, I’ll focus on Corbin’s
arguments about approval and endorsement, i.e., about (mis)attribution.
Finally, Corey Brettschneider and Nelson Tebbe argue for significant
governmental discretion in the specialty-plates setting in part to avoid

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1326.
See id. at 1342–43.
See id. at 1347–48.
Corbin, supra note 34.
Id. at 647, 655.
Id. at 656.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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speech being attributed to the state.159 (This is part of their advancing a
mixed speech model, which I’ll discuss in Part V.) They support Texas’s
denial of the SCV specialty plate in part because otherwise the state would
risk “seeming complicit” in the Confederate flag message, because
reasonable persons, especially if “not familiar with the specialty license
plate system, could reasonably think that the flag was displayed with the
state’s imprimatur.”160 They maintain similarly that “Texas has an interest
of constitutional magnitude in avoiding the reasonable perception that it is
endorsing what many citizens would take to be racist speech.”161 They also
refer to the risk that specialty plate messages “will be associated with the
state.”162 Writing for himself, Tebbe refers to the state’s “legitimate interest
in avoiding the impression that it is endorsing a message of racial bias.”163
Michael Dorf similarly writes of the “substantial risk that Texas . . . will
convey some level of government endorsement of the private speech on the
specialty plates,” adding that “the government does have a real interest in
avoiding being seen by the public to endorse offensive messages.”164
In many of the settings in which the state provides private speech
opportunities, there is no reasonable risk of attributing—or
misattributing—the resulting speech to the state, because of the vast array
of messages the state permits. This debunking of the misattribution concern
is a principal lesson from the quartet of cases involving state exclusion of
religious speech from physical or funding forums. Widmar, Lamb’s
Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club hold that if the state opens a
physical or funding forum for a wide variety of speakers, it does not violate
the Establishment Clause to include religious speech as well.165 We do not

159. See Corey Brettschneider & Nelson Tebbe, A License to Say Anything?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/10/opinion/a-license-to-say-anything.html?_r=0.
160. Id.
161. Corey Brettschneider & Nelson Tebbe, Clearing Up the Court’s Confusion About License
Plates, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 31, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/03/clearing-up-courtsconfusion-about.html.
162. Id. Similarly, Brettschneider argues that if a state law school includes the Christian Legal
Society (CLS) among the many student groups it subsidizes, and the CLS doesn’t give equal
membership rights to openly gay and lesbian students, this “would raise the problem of complicity. The
state’s financial support for the CLS would make it complicit in the group’s message of
discrimination.” Corey Brettschneider, Value Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint Neutrality: A
Theory of Free Speech and its Implications for the State Speech and Limited Public Forum Doctrines,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 603, 633 (2013); see also BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note 79, at 119.
163. Nelson Tebbe, Neither Side Got it Right In The Texas License Plate Case (June 19, 2015),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/06/neither-side-got-it-right-in-texas.html.
164. Michael Dorf, No Middle Ground in Confederate License Plate Case (June 18, 2015),
http://dorfonlaw.org/2015/06/no-middle-ground-in-confederate-license.html.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 58–75; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion) (asserting a similar idea in setting of federal law
compelling equal access for all student groups, including religious, to use public school space during
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properly see the government as endorsing religious speech in this setting,
but rather as opening speech opportunities broadly, endorsing none of the
resulting messages. This principle applies easily to a state that permits
more than 350 specialty plate messages, as Texas does, and knocks out one
of the pillars of Justice Breyer’s argument in Walker. It would apply
similarly to public transit vehicles that display a wide variety of
commercial and noncommercial messages. This principle suggests that the
Court was wrong in Lehman, Greer, and Cornelius to focus on attribution/
endorsement in upholding the subject-matter restrictions in those cases.166
If a city permits political ads as well as commercial ones, the reasonable
viewer response would be not that the city is endorsing any particular ad
but rather that it is endorsing none.167 If the Army permits political
speakers on its base along with various other speakers and entertainers, the
reasonable response would be not that the Army is endorsing any particular
speaker but instead that it is endorsing none. If the federal government
permits legal defense and political advocacy organizations along with a
bevy of other groups to raise funds from federal employees at their
workplaces, the same analysis applies: no reasonable perception of
endorsement of any of the groups involved.
This principle—that endorsement or attribution does not follow when
the government opens the door to all sorts of messages—has a direct
analogue in two other areas of First Amendment law.168 In the
Establishment Clause setting, when government supports both secular and
religious schools with vouchers or other taxpayer money, the Court has
refused to see endorsement of the religious recipients.169 And in the
compelled speech setting, when the state requires a private actor to host or
support a cornucopia of messages, the normal rule against compelled
speech is suspended, in part because the attribution/endorsement concern
drops away.170

noninstructional time); Corbin, supra note 34, at 635 (“Arguably, if the government is constitutionally
bound to allow all viewpoints in a forum, no viewpoint . . . should be attributable to the government.”).
166. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); supra text
accompanying notes 35–53.
167. Here I depart from a briefly stated different approach in Greene, Speech Platforms, supra
note 7, at 1257.
168. For a discussion of these areas of First Amendment law in the setting of determining what
should count as a “substantial burden” on religious exercise for purposes of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, see Abner S. Greene, Religious Freedom and (Other) Civil Liberties: Is There a
Middle Ground?, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 185–90 (2015).
169. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
170. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006); Bd. of
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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Although there might be some settings with more limited speech
opportunities in which it is appropriate to attribute the resulting messages
to the state (perhaps Summum is a good example), the Widmar principle
should have applied to Walker. Norton, Corbin, Brettschneider, Tebbe, and
Dorf are right to think the state should have some content-based control
over specialty plate messages—indeed, some viewpoint-based control—but
not because otherwise people will believe the state has endorsed the odious
messages. Rather, the state should be permitted to erect speech platforms
without being required to foster racist and other hateful or even vulgar
speech.171
My argument assumes that in many of the settings discussed here, the
reasonable person would understand that the state is opening a forum for
private speech and not speaking itself. But what if people make mistakes of
fact? Part of the scholarly response to these cases turns on that. The
mistakes could be based on incomplete information, e.g., seeing one car
with a specialty license plate and not knowing other cars have different
specialty license plates.172 Or they could be based on incomplete
information of a different sort, e.g., not appreciating that a school district
has a written and applied policy of allowing all student groups to meet in
classrooms after school. The mistakes could also be based on erroneous
reasoning: even if one knows the state has opened a forum for a wide array
of messages, one might incorrectly conclude that the state is endorsing
(rather than merely tolerating) all the messages it permits. How should free
speech doctrine respond to the possibility of mistake in these settings?
Individuals probably have a First Amendment right against
misattribution by the state.173 This might be grounded in the Free Speech
Clause or more generally in the unenumerated but widely recognized right
of expressive association. The right against compelled speech is best
understood as a right not to foster a message one does not wish to foster,
but sometimes the Court focuses on the concern with being improperly
tagged with a message with which one does not want to be associated.174
Furthermore, in an important compelled subsidy case, Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Ass’n, the Court held that generic ads funded by compelled fees
171. See Norton, Not for Attribution, supra note 90, at 1323 (referring to the state’s “negative
expressive interests”).
172. Even if this were true in Walker, and even if this misattribution to the state of what is in fact
a private message permitted by the state were a ground for deeming the specialty plates state speech,
this kind of misattribution would be less likely to occur in other speech platforms (such as vanity plates,
transit ads, and public school classrooms for after-school activity).
173. For my prior treatment of this, see Greene, (Mis)Attribution, supra note 7, at 833–44.
174. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 575–77 (1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1986).
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from beef producers are government speech not subject to First
Amendment attack.175 In dissent, Justice Souter contended that a reasonable
person would see the ads as the speech of the private parties and that this
misattribution should be sufficient for a successful compelled speech
claim.176 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion left open the possibility of an asapplied challenge “if it were established . . . that individual beef
advertisements were attributed to [the plaintiffs].”177 In both the straight-on
compelled speech cases (where law requires one to speak or carry a
message) and in the Johanns-type setting (compelled subsidy could become
a compelled speech claim as-applied), the possibility that the individual
could escape misattribution by disclaiming the message is problematic
because that would require the individual to speak when she might prefer to
remain silent.178 The Court needs to flesh this out, but there’s good
groundwork for concluding that individuals have a right against
misattribution by the state.
There’s no similar ground, though, for concluding that the state has a
right or interest in avoiding messages being misattributed to it. Remember
that what’s at stake here is allowing the state to restrict private speech
opportunities either by deeming the speech governmental (thus allowing
broad content-based choices) or by providing the predicate for fairly broad
content-based choices in limiting a public forum. If there is a weighty
enough state interest in avoiding faulty attribution of messages, the result is
more state control and fewer private messages. But the government isn’t a
rights bearer. It has interests in protecting the public, interests that weigh
into various constitutional calculations. But it’s a stretch to say the
government has an interest in protecting the public from erroneous
attribution of a message to the government itself. Moreover, although
individuals shouldn’t be forced to disclaim unwanted speech attributed to
them by the state, if states can issue appropriate disclaimers to ward off
misattribution, they should be required to do so, rather than relying on the
misattribution to close off private speech opportunities.179 The state does
have an interest—indeed, an obligation—to avoid violating the
Constitution, so it must steer clear of expression that endorses religion
175. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
176. See id. at 577–79 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 565.
178. See Greene, (Mis)Attribution, supra note 7, at 844, 850; see also PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
179. For an instructive exchange regarding disclaimers to ensure viewers will see religious
speech in a traditional public forum as private and not the government’s, see Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). For scholarship discussing governmental disclaimers to
avoid misattribution, see Bezanson & Buss, supra note 88, at 1483; Jacobs, supra note 90, at 57–60;
Norton, Not for Attribution, supra note 90, at 1339–40.
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(thus violating the Establishment Clause). Even here, there’s an unresolved
question whether mistaken attribution of religious speech to the state
should ground an Establishment Clause claim or whether only speech that
is in fact that of the government should qualify.180 Although it is less clear
from doctrine, government may also have an obligation to avoid violating
the Equal Protection Clause by denigrating persons based on race and other
protected characteristics.181 Here, too, we need to think more about whether
mistaken attribution of denigrating speech to the state violates the Equal
Protection Clause or whether only speech that is in fact that of the
government should qualify. Except when necessary to avoid violating the
Constitution, however, the state should not be able to reduce otherwise
available private speech opportunities by invoking the need to avoid
misattribution to itself.182
Thus, the misattribution argument, central to many of these cases at the
borderline of government speech and limited public forum doctrine, is
(mostly) mistaken. Without the misattribution argument, the holdings in
Walker, Lehman, Greer, and Cornelius are on shaky ground. Perhaps
Summum survives because the selectivity is tighter and because the city
didn’t open a platform for private speakers. The demise of the
misattribution argument in many of these cases helps refocus our attention
on what the state is actually doing. In Walker, in cases involving public
transit ads, and in cases involving limits on the use of public school
classrooms for after-school meetings, the government is seeking to set up
platforms for private speech without being forced by First Amendment
doctrine to foster racist and other hateful messages as well as vulgarity. In
Lehman, Greer, and Cornelius, the government was after something

180. In Pinette, speaking for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Scalia ruled out mistaken attribution
as the ground for an Establishment Clause claim, see 515 U.S. at 764–66, but the other five Justices—in
concurrences and dissents—left the door open to such a claim. See id. at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring
in part and in the judgment) (not calling it mistaken attribution, but the better view might be that she’s
referring to reasonable mistake of fact); id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)
(open to mistake of fact here); id. at 799, 807 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (opinion implies same). In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, though, six Justices
refused to accept possible mistaken attribution—at least by schoolchildren, in the setting of classrooms
opened for after-school meetings—as the ground for an Establishment Clause claim. See 533 U.S. 98,
112–19 (2001); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality
opinion) (“We think that secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that
a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory
basis.”).
181. See Tebbe, supra note 97, at 651, 658–68.
182. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1399
(2001). Misattribution to the state might disrupt our ability to hold it accountable for its speech, but as I
have argued in the text, deeming what is in fact private speech to be government speech because of
misattribution would reduce private speech opportunities, and the state can restore a true line of
accountability through disclaimers (even if not always at the site of the speech).
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different (and perhaps less defensible), best put as avoiding having to host
controversial speech. Justice Breyer was onto something important when,
at the end of his Walker opinion, he wrote, “just as Texas cannot require
SCV to convey ‘the State’s ideological message,’ SCV cannot force Texas
to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates.”183 He
was referring to Wooley v. Maynard, which awarded a compelled-speechbased opt out from displaying the New Hampshire state motto “Live Free
or Die” on one’s license plate.184 The best understanding of Wooley is that
it gives one a right to avoid having one’s property be the medium for
fostering the state’s (or any other person’s) message. Conversely (and this
is the elegance of Breyer’s point), the state should be permitted to provide
specialty plate speech opportunities without being compelled to foster or
host all manner of odious messages. But—contra the rest of Breyer’s
opinion—this is not to avoid misattribution of message to the state, and it’s
not because the message is in fact state speech. Perhaps blinded by the
strong “no viewpoint restrictions in limited public forums” holdings of the
Widmar set of cases (and without paying sufficient attention to the correct
rejection of the misattribution argument in those cases), the Court wasn’t
able to reach the appropriate conclusion in Walker: Texas should win, but
only if we develop a new understanding of limited public forums as speech
platforms subject to some content-based state discretion, including,
sometimes, viewpoint restrictions.
V. MIXED SPEECH
The government speech and limited public forum models are outcome
determinative in cases such as Walker. Under the former, the state may
accept or reject specialty plates even for viewpoint-based reasons (with
some limits based in constitutional provisions outside the Free Speech
Clause). Under the latter, the state may not make viewpoint-based
judgments of inclusion and exclusion. But neither model is satisfactory.
Government speech doesn’t accurately describe the various messages that
appear on specialty license plates and similarly doesn’t capture what’s
going on with vanity plates, public transit ads, or after-school public
classroom meetings. And although “limited public forum” is a fair enough
description of the speech opportunities in these settings, the strict noviewpoint-discrimination rule that the doctrine appears to require leaves

183. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2253 (2015)
(citation omitted) (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977)).
184. 430 U.S. 705, at 714–15.
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government with a tough choice. Either it must allow hateful and vulgar
speech in these forums or it must shut them down.
Responding to this dilemma, some scholars have proposed a “mixed
speech” model, according to which in some of these settings we consider
the expression to be both the state’s and the private person’s. Caroline Mala
Corbin appears to have coined the phrase mixed speech.185 Helen Norton
has described it as “joint speech.”186 Also using the term mixed speech,187
Corey Brettschneider and Nelson Tebbe have referred to speech
“blending”188 state and private messages. I will set forth Corbin’s basic
argument and then explain why it usually doesn’t capture what’s going on
as a descriptive matter. Partly the problem is an improper reliance on the
misattribution concern. Corbin is right, though, to insist on some form of
elevated scrutiny for viewpoint restrictions in speech platforms.
Corbin says the “mixed nature of the speech is apparent” in settings
such as public transit ads and specialty plates.189 She also refers to
government funding of private speech, although she recognizes that is less
obviously mixed.190 She proposes “five interrelated factors”191 to determine
if speech is the state’s, a private party’s, or mixed: who is the literal
speaker; who controls the message; who pays for the message; what is the
context of the speech; and to whom would a reasonable person attribute the
speech?192 “[U]nless all factors point exclusively to private speech or
exclusively to government speech, the speech is mixed.”193 Taking
specialty plates as her main example, Corbin contends that all factors point
in both directions: the literal speaker is both state and private person; both
control the message to some extent; although private persons pay extra for
the specialty plate, the state’s funding plays a role; context is tricky here,
the state’s goal being a mix of opening but not fully opening a speech
opportunity; and attribution would be to the state and the private person.194
Because the factors point in both directions, we can’t treat specialty
plates just as private speech, argues Corbin.195 Much of her discussion on

185. See Corbin, supra note 34.
186. See Norton, Measure, supra note 90, at 621; see also Norton, Not for Attribution, supra note
90, at 1320.
187. See Brettschneider & Tebbe, supra note 161; Brettschneider & Tebbe, supra note 159;
Tebbe, supra note 163.
188. Brettschneider & Tebbe, supra note 159.
189. Corbin, supra note 34, at 607.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 627.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 628.
194. See id. at 640–47.
195. See id. at 647–62.
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this point is about (mis)attribution. “[B]ecause of the undeniably strong
government component, the government may be seen as approving views it
does not condone”196 and “will likely be viewed as endorsing or, at a
minimum, tolerating [the] messages.”197 Requiring strict viewpoint
neutrality would “force the government to associate itself with messages
that it would not voluntarily endorse or tolerate.”198 This endorsement/
attribution problem also exists in the public transit ads setting, maintains
Corbin.199 On the other hand, she observes, we can’t treat specialty plates
just as state speech.200 There’s often a lack of transparency about the state’s
role, and the viewer might think the state is tolerating but not endorsing the
speech. One might add that the large number of messages that appear on
specialty plates in many states makes it harder to treat them as the
messages of the government.
Corbin concludes that we should treat specialty plates (and other
settings in which the government provides private speech opportunities) as
mixed speech and that we should apply intermediate scrutiny.201 This
scrutiny is meant to be rigorous202 but to permit the state to reject messages
that are harmful (perhaps tracking constitutional harms, such as to
equality), in part to protect citizens from such harm203 and in part to avoid
endorsement of or association with such messages.204 The case for limiting
vulgar speech is weaker because the harm is less and there’s a risk of
targeting unpopular viewpoints.205
Corbin is appropriately responding to the dilemma posed by statecreated speech opportunities that come with content-based restrictions that
leave courts to the unsatisfying government speech or limited public forum
doctrinal options. But mixed speech doesn’t accurately capture what’s
going on in many of these settings. The mixed speech concept makes sense
when it’s hard to disentangle the state’s role from the private person’s role.
Johanns206 may be a good example of this; although the Court held that the
generic beef ads are formally government speech, the speech appears
mixed because of the private funding of the ads and the lack of clear
attribution to the government. (In that setting, the mixed speech label leads
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 647.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
See id. at 658–59.
See id. at 662–70.
See id. at 671–88.
See id. at 675.
See id. at 686.
See id. at 673, 683, 686.
See id. at 688.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
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to a legitimate concern about compelled speech.) Rust v. Sullivan207 may be
another good example of mixed speech; although the Court held that the
restriction on abortion referral and counseling was government speech,208
there was a concern that the indigent women patients would be confused as
to the source of the advice they were getting, because of the lack of clear
attribution to the government in what is typically a private doctor-patient
setting. (That concern underpins a serious claim of undue burden on
abortion rights.) But specialty plates are different. What’s mixed about the
speech on specialty plates is that part is the state’s (the ID number and the
name TEXAS) and part is the private person’s (the separate “special”
message). Private ads on public transit vehicles are similar: the vehicles are
the state’s, and there are plenty of state messages on them, but the
advertising is the private parties’. Ditto for public school classrooms for
after-school activities: the space is the state’s, and there are plenty of
messages from the faculty and staff in the classrooms, but the student group
meetings after school hours constitute private speech.
These last observations about specialty plates, public transit ads, and
public school classroom after-school student meetings go straight to the
misattribution concern to which Corbin returns several times in her
argument. Although she sometimes acknowledges that viewers might
appreciate that the state is simply tolerating the private messages it is
permitting, often she focuses on the state’s concern with being tagged with
the messages, with viewers thinking the state is endorsing the messages.
But as I argued in Part IV, in most of the speech platforms I discuss, the
reasonable person should not conclude that the state is endorsing the wide
variety of messages it permits. If Texas opened the door to the SCV
specialty plate and all sorts of other messages, both hateful and not, the
reasonable response would not be to attribute the messages to the state but
rather to see the state as provider of speech opportunities for many. Yes,
the state is tolerating the messages, but it is not endorsing them. When we
combine that point with the point that the speech on specialty plates, public
transit ads, and in student after-school meetings in public school
classrooms is mixed only in that some of it is the state’s and some the
private person’s, the case for a “mixed speech” category is significantly
diminished.

207. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
208. The Court held that the government may “selectively fund a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.” Id. at 193. See also Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001) (although Rust “did not place explicit reliance on the rationale
that the counseling activities of the doctors . . . amounted to governmental speech,” the Court has since
“explained Rust on this understanding”).
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Once we see these settings as platforms for private speech, we can take
Corbin’s instinct—that the state should not be strictly limited by the noviewpoint-restriction rule—and expand upon it. States should be permitted
some viewpoint-based restrictions in speech platforms, specifically for
hateful/demeaning or vulgar speech, because government has a substantial
interest in not fostering, not hosting, not providing a platform for such
instances of private speech. This is the way out of the government speech/
limited public forums doctrinal dilemma, not the mixed speech model.
VI. THE CONCEPT OF THE SPEECH PLATFORM
The case law and the scholarship have left us at an impasse.
Government often wants to set up speech opportunities for private persons
but doesn’t want to open the door to every type of message. The state’s
interest here isn’t as regulator, and it isn’t as speaker. It’s something
different, and the closest the doctrine has come to recognizing that
difference is the concept of the limited public forum. But even there, the
Court balks at permitting viewpoint restrictions. The scholars in this area
have tried to work within the contours of the government speech and public
forum doctrines, or they have sought a new concept, of “mixed speech.”
That concept, though, is too indebted to mistakes about mistakes
(misattribution of private speech to the state), and in any event too often
describes as mixed or joint or blended speech that is better seen as an
opportunity provided by the government for private persons. Walker is a
stark example of the impasse—a majority opinion that doesn’t ring true
descriptively and a dissent that doesn’t ring true normatively. A
Confederate flag specialty plate wouldn’t be (and wouldn’t be reasonably
seen as) the speech of the state of Texas, but to require Texas to allow its
display would force the state to provide a platform for racist and other
hateful speech when it opens speech platforms at all.
Here is how this Part will proceed. Limited public forum doctrine is
based on one sturdy leg, one shaky one. The sturdy leg is deference to state
purpose. The shaky leg is concern about misattribution; fixing this will
permit us to see more clearly that the state is often seeking to provide a
platform for a wide variety of private expression while maintaining some
control over harmful messages, even if the control is viewpoint based. To
make the case for relaxing the rule against viewpoint restrictions in limited
public forums, I will focus on the strongest argument for that rule: distrust
of the state to draw principled lines, i.e., “negative theory.” I will
summarize scholarship developing the government distrust model of free
speech law and will explore how the Court has used that model to hold
legislatures and administrative actors in check. But just as negative theory
makes sense to buttress free speech law regarding regulation and traditional
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public forums, it doesn’t apply to government speech, and it should
similarly not apply to state restriction of messages in limited public forums.
To help signal this doctrinal shift, and to use a more accurate term, we
should call limited public forums “speech platforms.” We will still apply
the reasonableness test developed for limited public forums to subjectmatter restrictions, which usually are justified under such a test, although
this can sometimes be surprisingly difficult. We should, though, apply
elevated scrutiny to viewpoint restrictions in speech platforms; although
this will block the state from merely taking sides in a contested debate, it
will permit government to forbid hateful or vulgar messages, even if those
restrictions are viewpoint based.
The principal Court grounding for limited public forum doctrine with
which I agree is the acceptance of state purpose in setting the contours of
the forum. This doesn’t mean complete deference, but it distinguishes how
the Court treats traditional public forums. As discussed in Part I, the state
could claim that since the main purpose of parks and streets is for
recreation and transportation, it has the power to establish broad restrictions
on expression in those places. Our doctrine has resisted this because of a
cultural/legal commitment to parks and streets being open to speech. As we
do for state speech, though, it makes sense to adopt a more deferential
approach to governmental claims of purpose in establishing limited public
forums. There is less need to rein in state claims of limited purpose,
because we have the relatively unregulated arenas of pure private speech
and traditional public forums, and because the government speech model,
discussed in Part II, is a better (though not perfect) fit for the state’s goals
with limited public forums. Just as the state has affirmative messages to
convey with its own speech, so does it want to provide platforms for
private persons to convey such messages. And just as the state does not
want to express certain messages, so does it not want to provide platforms
for such messages. We can see speech platforms as aiding in the state’s
promotion of specific values in a nonregulatory way.
Limited public forum doctrine is also deferential to the state because of
a concern with people attributing private messages in such forums to the
state. As explored in Parts I and IV, this misattribution concern was
important to the Court in Lehman, Greer, and Cornelius. That the Court
thought people might misattribute private political speech to the
government in those cases, however, is inconsistent with the Court’s
correct reasoning in the Widmar line of cases that reasonable persons do
not misattribute speech to the state when it opens space for a wide array of
expression. Removing the misattribution concern from the Court’s limited
public forum reasoning doesn’t undermine my case for more deference to
the state in such forums. Instead, it helps us see more clearly that the state
interest isn’t avoiding unwanted attribution but rather to not provide a

1 GREENE - SPEECH PLATFORM - 337-394 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

The Concept of the Speech Platform

12/5/2016 12:45 PM

379

platform for harmful speech. The same is true with Walker: as discussed in
Parts III and IV, once we remove the misattribution concern, we can more
clearly see that Texas has not itself spoken, but rather has set up a platform
for private speech while wanting to avoid fostering racist and other harmful
messages.
Our stringent First Amendment protection for expression is based in
several affirmative values and also in what Frederick Schauer has called the
“argument from negative implication,”209 which I am referring to as
“negative theory.” These values and arguments can be fully realized in our
doctrine regarding criminal and civil regulation of expression and regarding
traditional (and designated) public forums. The affirmative values of
expression, and negative theory, are not part of government speech
doctrine, where a different argument for value takes over—for the value of
the state itself advancing its conceptions of the good, even if contested. The
question I have been addressing in this Article is where limited public
forums ought to fit in this matrix. The Court has, to some extent, allowed
state discretion regarding such forums, borrowing some from the deference
it gives to state speech, but it has stopped at viewpoint restrictions.
Something about those, it seems, requires standard, strict, First Amendment
treatment.
Promoting the affirmative values of expression seems an unlikely
reason to be overly concerned about viewpoint restrictions in limited public
forums. Whatever value one focuses on—finding true or right answers,
democratic participation and checking of government, and individual
liberty or autonomy—may be advanced by not imposing criminal or civil
sanctions based on viewpoint and by a rule against viewpoint restrictions in
traditional public forums. These values could be advanced as well in
limited public forums, but given the richness of our free speech protection
in the regulatory and traditional public forum settings, there are many ways
to communicate all sorts of messages (including hateful or vulgar),
supported by whatever affirmative value one’s theory favors. The strongest
and most salient justification for the rule against viewpoint restrictions in
limited public forums is the argument from negative theory: We can’t trust
the state to pick and choose among messages to determine which are
inappropriately hateful or vulgar; the risk that the powers-that-be will help
their friends and harm their enemies is too strong; an otherwise valid
ideal—refusing to provide speech platforms for truly harmful speech—is,
in the cauldron of politics, too likely to be the occasion for political
favoritism and correctness of one sort or another. Thus, the argument goes,
even if we’re okay with some subject-matter restrictions in limited public
209. SCHAUER, supra note 8, at 80.
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forums, which we wouldn’t accept elsewhere, the negative theory concern
with viewpoint restrictions remains.
In his book Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, Schauer writes,
“We believe there is something special about free speech, for otherwise we
would not refer to it as we do.”210 The question is whether a free speech
principle can be justified; whether, despite the fact that speech can cause
harm, there is “a reason for tolerating speech . . . distinct from arguments
for toleration in general.”211 After setting forth some arguments for and
against the standard affirmative arguments for a free speech principle,
Schauer writes a chapter called “[t]he utility of suppression.”212 He refers to
the “argument from negative implication.”213 Even if we can’t derive a free
speech principle from an affirmative argument or arguments, “the state may
have less ability to regulate speech than it has to regulate other forms of
conduct, or the attempt to regulate speech may entail special harms or
special dangers not present in regulation of other conduct.”214 Government
may be “particularly bad at censorship,” and “[o]ne reason may be the bias
or self-interest of those entrusted with the task of regulating speech.”215 In
sum,
[f]reedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the ability
of government to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust of
governmental determinations of truth and falsity, an appreciation of
the fallibility of political leaders, and a somewhat deeper distrust of
governmental power in a more general sense.216
This may be seen as “the argument from governmental incompetence.”217
In later work Schauer adds that “official discretion to determine the value
of speech content has long been understood to be incompatible with the
principle of free speech itself, one of whose central themes is distrust of
government.”218
In his book Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression?, Larry
Alexander contends that the core of any conception of freedom of

210. Id. at 6.
211. Id. at 12.
212. Id. at 73.
213. Id. at 80.
214. Id. at 81.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 86.
217. Id.
218. Schauer, supra note 33, at 111; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 145 (concern is either
that the state “is unduly error-prone in assessing expression’s harms and benefits” or that “it has
motives for regulating—notably, self-protection—that render it untrustworthy in doing so”).
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expression is the principle of “evaluative neutrality,” which “requires
regulators to abstain from acting on the basis of their own assessments of a
message’s truth or value.”219 This is similar to Schauer’s negative theory,
but where Schauer has some faith in the ability of free speech doctrine to
cordon off the problem, Alexander is a skeptic, arguing that “[f]reedom of
expression is paradoxical within any plausible normative theory. That is
because the requirement of evaluative neutrality is the core of any right of
freedom of expression, but evaluative neutrality cannot coexist with any
normative theory.”220 Alexander’s predicate is too strong, though, and if
one relaxes it, the ways in which our free speech doctrine accounts for
expression’s value would seem less paradoxical. The tests the Court has
developed to permit content-based regulation by category are best
understood as a rough balance between value and harm. As the Court put it,
it is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has been
accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within
the confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake,
that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.221
When the Court engages in ad hoc strict scrutiny it is also balancing value
against harm,222 and such a balance is especially obvious in the many time,
place, and manner cases in which the Court engages in true intermediate
scrutiny—the state wins about half the time.223 Although the balance in

219. ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 11.
220. Id. at 177; see also id. at 81 (“Paradoxically, finding a right of freedom of expression that
feels ‘just right’ in terms of its scope requires the very evaluations of messages that any conception of
freedom of expression would view as its central evil.”).
221. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982); see also Genevieve Lakier, The
Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2231 (2015) (“[C]ourts have no recourse but
to engage in the difficult task of judging constitutional value.”); SHIFFRIN, supra note 82, at 22 (“[I]n
determining what speech is or is not protected, right or wrong, the Court regularly makes judgments as
to the value of types of speech.”).
222. For example, the best understanding of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(2010), is that although the speech involved was political and of high value, the potential harm of
support to terrorist organizations was also high, and deferring to the legislative and executive
assessment of that risk, the Court struck the balance in favor of the government.
223. For time, place, and manner cases in which the state loses, see, for example, Watchtower
Bible and Tract Soc’y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002); Lee v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). For
time, place, and manner cases in which the state wins, see, for example, Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)
(plurality opinion); Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Heffron
v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949).
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those cases doesn’t involve assessment of speech content, nonetheless the
Court is assessing the value of expression against its harms.
Although our constitutional order is constantly engaged in weighing
the value of speech against the harm it causes, Alexander is correct to share
Schauer’s concern that allowing the state to assess speech value runs a risk
of message discrimination and inappropriate bias. Our way of avoiding this
has been by insisting on categories and rules and by not erecting a free
speech doctrine that turns too much on ad hoc assessments. As Schauer
puts it, “the First Amendment operates . . . by the entrenchment of
categories whose breadth prevents the consideration of some number of
relevant factors, and prevents the free speech decision maker from
‘thinking small.’”224 Sometimes the negative theory concern arises when
legislatures enact content-based statutes and try to expand the categories of
regulable speech or win on ad hoc strict scrutiny. Two good examples are
Texas v. Johnson225 and United States v. Alvarez.226 In Johnson, the Court
addressed a Texas law that banned, among other things, the “desecration”
of the national flag.227 As applied to Johnson’s clearly politically
expressive act of flag burning, the Court held the statute unconstitutional,
in part because the statute required proof that Johnson knew the act would
“seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action.”228 Offense isn’t a constitutionally valid ground for regulating
expression (particularly high-value, political expression). In so holding, the
Court rejected the argument that the American flag is distinctive in a way
that overrides standard free speech protection.229 The rejection turned in
part on negative theory:
[T]o conclude that the government may permit designated symbols
to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be
to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries.
Could the government, on this theory, prohibit the burning of state
flags? Of copies of the Presidential seal? Of the Constitution? In
evaluating these choices under the First Amendment, how would
we decide which symbols were sufficiently special to warrant this
unique status? To do so, we would be forced to consult our own

224. Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 397,
408 (1989); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–72 (2010) (rejecting ad hoc cost–
benefit analysis in free speech law).
225. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
226. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).
227. 491 U.S. at 400 n.1 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (West 1989)).
228. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b)).
229. Id. at 417–18.
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political preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very
way that the First Amendment forbids us to do.230
The Stolen Valor Act criminalizes false representations about receipt of
military honors.231 We can assume it requires scienter, i.e., that the
statement be knowingly false.232 The Alvarez Court invalidated the statute
under the First Amendment.233 The principal opinions don’t have much
good to say about such lies; the opinions turn on the lack of harm from the
lies and thus the low government interest in punishing them. The plurality
opinion added this: “Permitting the government to decree this speech to be
a criminal offense, whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely
audible whisper, would endorse government authority to compile a list of
subjects about which false statements are punishable. That governmental
power has no clear limiting principle.”234
The negative theory portions of Johnson and Alvarez are concerned
with the legislature’s and the Court’s inability to draw constitutionally
acceptable lines between regulable and nonregulable speech. I have some
doubts about this version of negative theory for reasons similar to why
slippery slope arguments are overused.235 The Court’s concern is that even
if it recognized (say) burning the American flag and lying about military
honors as sufficiently and distinctively harmful, outweighing any value
from the speech, both the legislature and it would be unable to distinguish
other claims for distinctive expressive harm in the future, either because
such lines are too hard to draw or because of the fear they can’t be drawn
without politics and ideology entering into the mix. If, though, the Court
(or legislatures, with the Court as a backstop) can reason carefully enough
to draw acceptable, ideology-neutral lines, then the negative theory claim
of the statutory slippery slope variety isn’t as strong.
Whatever one thinks about this matter, the Court’s negative theory
concern with permitting administrative officials or juries to make case-bycase determinations of expressive harm is sound.236 Two good examples are

230. Id. at 417.
231. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543 (plurality opinion) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012)).
232. See id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
233. Id. at 2551.
234. Id. at 2547 (plurality opinion).
235. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); Eugene
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
236. One might say the Court or courts sit as backstops to review such discretion according to
principles similar to those used in sorting statutes that regulate expression, so why is the negative theory
concern greater here than with statutes? One answer is that sorting statutes can still occur at a
sufficiently high level of generality to protect against core bias concerns of negative theory. Another
answer is that administrative officials and juries make scores of fact-nuanced decisions with little
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Cohen v. California237 and Snyder v. Phelps.238 The California statute in
Cohen required police officers (and then prosecutors and juries) to
determine whether one has disturbed the peace by offensive conduct.239
This is a law of general applicability; all laws should be general, of course,
but in free speech discourse this means the law doesn’t on its face regulate
expression. But it might sometimes be applied to expression, and the
concern is that officials will make content-based—and perhaps viewpointbased—judgments in deciding whether the law applies. Cohen was
arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for wearing a jacket in a courthouse
corridor with the words “Fuck the Draft” plainly visible.240 Although the
state appellate court had construed “offensive conduct” to mean “behavior
which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in turn
disturb the peace,”241 the facts of the case revealed nothing that could
support a conviction on fighting words or hostile audience grounds.242 The
question remained whether California could punish Cohen because of the
offensiveness of the epithet. Although some of Justice Harlan’s opinion for
the Court turned on the affirmative virtues of Cohen’s speech, Harlan also
relied on negative theory: “the principle contended for by the State seems
inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish this from any other
offensive word?”243 Moreover, “we cannot indulge the facile assumption
that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk
of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize
upon the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning
the expression of unpopular views.”244 This is classic negative theory: a
distrust of state actors to draw principled lines (i.e., not biased regarding
the message itself).
In Snyder, members of the Westboro Baptist Church picketed the
funeral of Matthew Snyder, a U.S. Marine killed in the line of duty.245 “The
church’s congregation believes that God hates and punishes the United
States for its tolerance of homosexuality, particularly in America’s
military.”246 Although the picketing was 1,000 feet from the church,
chance for judicial review, either because we can’t recover the reasoning behind, say, an arrest or a
damages judgment or because there are too many instances of such and not enough judicial bandwidth.
237. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
238. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
239. See 403 U.S. at 16.
240. See id. at 16–17.
241. Id. at 17.
242. See id. at 20, 23.
243. Id. at 25.
244. Id. at 26.
245. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
246. Id.
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Snyder’s father was aware of the picketing.247 He sued the church on
various Maryland state law grounds; the Court focused on his intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort claim. “To succeed on a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe
emotional distress.”248 Although this is not a statute, it is still law of general
applicability: it applies to conduct generally, not on its face to expression,
although it sometimes might be applied to expression. Much of Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion upholding the Church’s First Amendment right to
engage in the picketing focused on the speech being a matter of public
concern249 and occurring in a public setting, “on public land next to a
public street.”250 But Roberts also included a paragraph turning on negative
theory. He wrote that
[t]he jury here was instructed that it could hold Westboro liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress based on a finding that
Westboro’s picketing was “outrageous.” “Outrageousness,”
however, is a highly malleable standard with “an inherent
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability
on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of
their dislike of a particular expression.” In a case such as this, a
jury is “unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of [the]
speech,” posing “a real danger of becoming an instrument for the
suppression of . . . ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasan[t]’” expression.”251
This danger of bias could exist even if the speech were on a matter of
private concern in a private setting; perhaps there the negative theory
concern would give way to the state interest in protecting the victim of the
intentionally inflicted emotional distress.
The rule against viewpoint restrictions in limited public forums turns
on concerns similar to those expressed in Cohen and Snyder. We can’t trust
government administrators to pick and choose among the messages people
wish to display on specialty or vanity license plates, on public transit ads,
or in public school classrooms for after-school meetings. Even if

247. See id. at 448–49.
248. Id. at 451.
249. See id. at 452–54.
250. Id. at 454.
251. Id. at 458 (alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55
(1988); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984)).
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administrators are trying in good faith to apply neutral principles focused
on restricting only speech that is sufficiently harmful (itself hard to do),
inevitably message bias will creep in and the administrators will find some
messages to be harmful (or not) because of political or other sympathies.
Furthermore, allowing administrative discretion in these settings will open
the door to bad-faith, knowingly biased message selection.
The negative theory concern is apt for limited public forums, however,
only if such forums are sufficiently similar to the regulatory or traditional
public forum settings. This analogy fails though. Negative theory in free
speech law helps to explain why we have a free speech principle, why we
treat expression with special care even though it causes real harm. That
explanation—distrust of the state to draw sufficiently principled lines when
it comes to speech, more so than when it comes to non-speech-related
conduct—is linked to the state as regulator, as the entity with the legitimate
power to impose criminal or civil sanctions. We extend this argument to
traditional public forums not by analytic necessity; we could see parks and
streets as government-owned space subject to less First Amendment
protection. We extend it, rather, because of a constitutional cultural
commitment to protecting some non-privately owned space for robust
expression.
When the state speaks, we operate with the opposite principle from the
regulatory or traditional public forum settings. We want the state to
promote its vision of the good, even if that is sometimes contested, i.e., not
viewpoint neutral. Or so I have argued in prior work and believe the
doctrine strongly supports.252 Whether upholding the abortion counseling
gag rule,253 or permitting the NEA to consider (in)decency in awarding arts
grants,254 or allowing a small town to pick and choose public monuments
with virtually no constitutional restriction,255 the Court has endorsed this
broad vision of government speech.
We should do something similar for limited public forums, and to help
make that doctrinal shift, we should call them speech platforms. “Public

252. For a contrary view, see ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 82–102. Alexander argues that it’s
hard to distinguish state selectivity in speech regulation from state selectivity in setting up forums for
private speech or in funding private speech or even in speaking itself. Alexander maintains we can’t
distinguish a law that regulates some but not other groups because of what the various groups stand for
from the state granting funds only to groups that will help advance the state’s message. See id. at 87. He
seems to be rejecting the difference between state action that imposes criminal or civil sanctions and
state action that selectively grants funds. I accept this distinction, see Greene, supra note 18 and articles
cited in note 80, supra, as does the Court. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
253. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 203.
254. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998).
255. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009).
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forum” tracks too closely to traditional public forums—streets and parks—
and thus starts with a rhetorical presumption in favor of standard free
speech rules. The Court has backed away from that in permitting
reasonable content-based restrictions in limited public forums, but has
maintained the no-viewpoint-restrictions rule (albeit largely in dicta). The
term “speech platforms” can describe the opportunities the state is
providing private citizens, while allowing us to reconsider the viewpoint
restrictions issue. When government provides speech platforms but doesn’t
want to foster hateful or vulgar speech, it is acting as participant in, not
regulator of, the speech market.256 Because the hit to a private speaker from
denial of access to a speech platform is just that—denial of access—and
not criminal or civil sanctions, we should permit viewpoint restrictions of
the sort I’ve been discussing, as we do with the state’s own speech. And we
should be no more concerned about the effect on the marketplace of ideas
than we are about the effect on the denied speaker, for that marketplace is
open for all manner of horrible speech, but without the state’s contribution
via its speech or platforms, physical or financial. In sum, we should
overcome our negative theory concerns in the setting of speech platforms
because criminal and civil sanctions are not involved, access to streets and
parks is not involved, and we want the state to provide space for a wide
variety of private speech while permitting it to avoid fostering certain types
of harmful messages.
Given that speech platforms occupy a conceptual space between
regulation of private speech and government speech, the standard of
judicial review for content-based restrictions in such platforms should
similarly rest somewhere between the strict scrutiny of the former and the
virtually carte blanche deference of the latter. The Court’s reasonableness
standard for subject-matter restrictions in limited public forums (speech
256. A few commenters on a draft of this Article have expressed doubt about the line I’m
drawing between imposing a penalty and withholding a benefit or privilege. The parade of horribles is
easy to state, e.g., would I allow tax exemptions or third-class mailing privileges to track the viewpoint
restrictions I want to allow in speech platforms? No, I would not. Much of the work here can be done
by recalling the anti-leveraging principle discussed at supra text accompanying notes 85–88. Many
examples in the parade of horribles will flunk this principle; the state may not set up a program for X
policy and then impose a speech condition unrelated to the policy, and similarly it may not establish a
general benefit/privilege that has nothing to do with expression and then impose a speech condition of
the kind discussed in this Article. But speech platforms are different. They are not general benefits or
privileges, and they are not programs with specific messages to be advanced. They are platforms for
private speech generally, with a restriction on specific kinds of harmful speech. This is not a leveraging
problem, and unless one adopts a position similar to Larry Alexander’s—that we can’t distinguish
among different types of state action, see supra note 252—then my fairly commonplace reliance on a
distinction between government as regulator and government as provider of benefit/privilege—here,
speech opportunities—is, at least formally, a sensible distinction. That leaves us with the admittedly
hard question of whether negative theory concerns should still apply here; after all, it’s still the state
making speech content decisions. I leave the reader to my discussion in the text on that.
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platforms) makes sense. But its rule against viewpoint restrictions is too
strict. To give government the leeway for which I have argued to impose
certain types of viewpoint restrictions in speech platforms, courts should
apply some form of elevated scrutiny short of strict. It doesn’t matter to my
analysis whether we call this enhanced reasonableness or intermediate
scrutiny or something else. Even if we recognize the state isn’t itself
speaking but rather is opening (and limiting) opportunities for private
speech, we should still permit some viewpoint restrictions, if we have
strong enough reasons for doing so (about which I will say more below).
This is so even though if regulation of private speech were involved,
negative theory would forbid the viewpoint restrictions under consideration
here.
I have focused on restricting speech platforms to avoid hateful or
vulgar speech. The former was at issue in Walker. My approach would
permit the state to forbid speech platform messages that would reasonably
be seen as disparaging persons on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
gender, sexual orientation, or any similar characteristic. If it would violate
the Equal Protection Clause for the state to disparage persons on one of the
grounds mentioned here, does that mean the state must forbid similarly
disparaging private speech in speech platforms? That is a hard question,
requiring assessment of the scope of harms the Equal Protection Clause
addresses and the complicated state action issue when the state is providing
a forum for private speech but not itself speaking. I don’t have an answer to
it now, so I will just say that the state may forbid such privately disparaging
speech in speech platforms, and leave for another day the question whether
it must do so.
Restrictions on speech platform messages that are demeaning or
disparaging based on race, etc. are clearly viewpoint based; after all, the
pro-racial equality message would be permitted.257 Whether speech
platform restrictions on vulgar speech are viewpoint based is a harder

257. See, e.g., In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1334–37 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (invalidating
federal prohibition of registering disparaging trademarks as unconstitutionally viewpoint based), cert.
granted sub nom., Lee v. Tam, 2016 WL 1587871 (2016). But see, e.g., Wandering Dago, Inc. v.
Destito, No. 1:13-CV-1053, 2016 WL 843374 (N.D.N.Y. March 1, 2016) (state denied application of
food truck for nonpublic forum because name of truck contained offensive ethnic slur; court holds this
viewpoint neutral), appeal filed sub nom. Wandering Dago, Inc. v. N.Y. Office of Gen. Servs., No. 16622 (2d. Cir. Mar. 3, 2016); Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571 (1st
Cir. 2015) (denial of demeaning or disparaging transit ads not seen as viewpoint based). For discussion
of recent anti-Muslim transit ads, see Engy Abdelkader, “Savagery” in the Subways: Anti-Muslim Ads,
the First Amendment, and the Efficacy of Counterspeech, 21 ASIAN AM. L.J. 43 (2014); see also Jack
Cheevers, Vanity Plates: One Man’s Slur is Another Man’s Badge, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 21, 1990),
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-08-21/news/mn-1132_1_license-plate (discussing California’s recall of
vanity plates that many viewers saw as disparaging Italian-Americans).
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question. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,258 the Justices
debated a similar issue. The issue was whether federal law requiring
“general standards of decency” to be part of federal arts funding decisions
violated the First Amendment.259 In the course of a majority opinion
answering no, Justice O’Connor concluded that “the considerations that the
provision introduces, by their nature, do not engender the kind of directed
viewpoint discrimination that would prompt this Court to invalidate a
statute on its face.”260 Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, and
Justice Souter, dissenting, concluded that the law requires viewpoint
considerations in arts funding. As Scalia said, an arts proposal giving good
regard for standards of decency gets favored over one that doesn’t, and that
is a viewpoint-based consideration, even though not as obvious as, say,
favoring Democrats over Republicans.261 As Souter put it, the point of the
law was to protect taxpayers from offense stemming from federally funded
indecent art.262 Indecent speech—and vulgar speech—is meant to shake
people up, to counter the mainstream and decorous,263 and restricting such
speech is restriction on dissent just as the more obvious favoring of the ins
over the outs would be. I’m inclined to agree with Scalia and Souter that a
restriction on vulgarity is viewpoint based.264 Nonetheless, states should be
permitted to keep vulgar speech out of speech platforms. Admittedly, the
harm is not the same as the more directed harm from hateful speech. It is
more diffuse, to public sensibilities and decorum. But in the speech
platform setting, government should be permitted to forbid vulgarity by
recognizing its value as low and the harm to public discourse as sufficiently
substantial.
The Widmar quartet of cases, in which state actors excluded religious
speech from forums otherwise open to student group speech, need not be
overruled. These are the only cases in which the Court has set aside
viewpoint restrictions in limited public forums. As previewed in Part I, we
can deem the restrictions invalid viewpoint discrimination. Once we
jettison the erroneous Establishment Clause concern about misattribution of

258. 524 U.S. 569.
259. Id. at 572–73.
260. Id. at 583.
261. See id. at 590–95 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
262. See id. at 603–07 (Souter, J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting) (restrictions based on decency “require discrimination
on the basis of conformity with mainstream mores”).
264. But see, e.g., Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejection of “SHTHPNS”
vanity license plate deemed viewpoint neutral); Mitchell v. Md. Motor Vehicle Admin., 126 A.3d 165
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015), cert. granted, 135 A. 3d 416 (2016) (rejection of “MIERDA” [Spanish for
“shit”] vanity license plate considered viewpoint neutral).
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private religious speech to the state, there’s no good reason left to exclude
religious speech from the forums in question.
What to do about Lehman, Greer, and Cornelius is a tough question.
Recall that each of those decisions upheld a limited public forum restriction
on speech in significant part because of a concern about misattribution.265
Lehman permitted a city to reject political ads on public transit vehicles—
although the city allowed other ads—because of the “appearance of
favoritism,” i.e., that people would mistakenly think the city was endorsing
candidates whose ads were shown on the vehicles (or was backing ads on
political issues).266 Likewise, bowing to a concern about appearance of
neutrality, Greer deferred to the military’s exclusion of organized political
speech from an Army base, although other speakers and organized speech
activity had been allowed.267 Cornelius similarly relied on the appearance
of favoritism when it permitted the federal government to exclude legal
defense and political advocacy organizations from soliciting funds during
the federal employee charity drive, which allowed other groups to raise
money.268 If one shares my view from Part IV that the misattribution
concern in these cases was misplaced, one is left searching for a
justification for these subject-matter exclusions of high-value speech from
limited public forums. The best answer is that the government in these
cases was seeking to avoid sparking controversy, seeking to avoid being
the agent, through being the speech platform provider, of conversational
conflict on the issues of the day.269 This flies in the face of a core First
Amendment commitment to a robust public sphere of debate. But just as
the state may choose with its own speech not to engage on tough, contested
issues,270 so may we accept its desire not to provide speech platforms for
such matters. Hot debate will still occur among private speakers generally
and in traditional public forums, but in some instances government will
want speech platforms to be the ground for matters less subject to dispute.
Although a limitation on controversial speech by subject matter in speech
platforms is itself controversial, such a restriction is reasonable enough to
be upheld in this setting.

265. See supra text accompanying notes 35–45, 50–53.
266. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).
267. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
268. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
269. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 805 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (“our ‘public forum’ cases do not foreclose public entities from . . . possibly . . . limiting
the use of [unattended displays in public parks] to the communication of noncontroversial messages.”).
270. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 579–80 (1998) (upholding
standards of decency as a factor in federal arts funding; even if this isn’t state speech, it’s the
government as patron, which is a close analogue).
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For similar reasons, the state should be permitted to exclude from
speech platforms all messages about a particular subject matter of public
debate. For example, it could exclude all specialty or vanity license plates
with messages on the abortion debate.271 Or all transit ads on the conflict in
the Middle East. The reason for these exclusions would not be fear of
misattribution to the state but rather not wanting to provide a platform for
speech on certain controversial topics.
I have argued that the state should be permitted to set up speech
platforms for private speech but impose some viewpoint-based restrictions.
In so doing, I have focused on hateful, demeaning speech based on race and
other characteristics that we protect in various ways through equality
doctrine, either constitutional or statutory.272 This raises the question
whether we should permit viewpoint-based restrictions more broadly in
speech platforms. My answer is generally no, and here is why. Even if one
adopts my approach in this Article—that in limited public forums, i.e.,
speech platforms, we should relax our normal negative theory/distrust of
government approach to viewpoint-based restrictions—such restrictions on
private speech are still problematic and should be subject to careful
scrutiny. The harm the state is seeking to prevent should not be just
anything the state considers harmful but instead should track
understandings of harm that are deeply and widely enough rooted in our
constitutional order to stand strong against the free expression value on the
other side. Although I am not taking a position on whether state racist
speech would violate the Equal Protection Clause or whether states must
restrict hate speech in speech platforms to avoid aiding and abetting private
speech that is inconsistent with equality norms, the value of equal
citizenship and personhood regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, gender,
or sexual orientation has been hard-won and is now well established.
Although there is “another side” when hate speech happens—the hateful
side—there is something like a consensus that that other side is wrong.
Furthermore, hate speech is itself harmful; the state restricts it not because
271. See, e.g., Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejection of
“Choose Life” specialty license plate valid because rejection based on subject matter and not
viewpoint), withdrawn, 611 F. App’x. 741 (2d Cir. 2015) (withdrawing in light of Walker and
remanding to District Court); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008) (same as the
initial Fiala holding).
272. I have also argued that the state should be permitted to forbid vulgarity in speech platforms.
I won’t say more about that here, other than to reiterate that there’s an interesting threshold question
about whether such restrictions are viewpoint based (I have argued that they are, see supra text
accompanying notes 258–64), and that the harm is to public sensibilities generally, as compared with
the more directed harm of demeaning or disparaging speech. Limits on vulgarity satisfy the elevated
scrutiny courts should apply to viewpoint-based restrictions in speech platforms because we can
recognize such speech as low value in a way we might not if regulation of private speech were involved
and because we can accept as significant or substantial a state interest in not fostering vulgar speech.
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it thinks the idea behind it is wrong (although it does think that) but
because the demeaning/disparaging nature of the speech inflicts direct
harm. There is of course a well-vetted debate about whether that fact
should permit regulation of hate speech. My point here is that one can
answer no to that question but yes to recognizing that direct harm as a key
part of the argument for upholding hate speech restrictions in speech
platforms.273
Now consider two other possible viewpoint-based restrictions in speech
platforms. Say a state wants to permit a “Right to Life” specialty license
plate but not a “Pro Choice” plate.274 This is a viewpoint-based restriction,
but not a permissible one on my argument. The state is not seeking to
protect a widely and deeply rooted constitutional value. In fact, it is
intervening in a situation where a constitutional right is at stake—to choose
whether or not to carry a fetus to term. And perhaps most importantly, the
harm the state would be seeking to protect against is not direct harm from
the speech itself. The state isn’t maintaining that the message “Pro Choice”
causes direct harm in the way a racist message does. Rather, the state is
maintaining that the position in the abortion debate reflected by the
message “Pro Choice” is wrong (and that the underlying action of abortion
is itself harmful). On elevated scrutiny, the harm the state is seeking to
prevent from restricting the message is neither a widely, deeply accepted
injury in our constitutional culture nor a direct harm from the message
itself. And on the other side of the scrutiny calculus a constitutional liberty
interest/right is at stake. Even without that latter factor in play, the state
should still not be able to make viewpoint-based restrictions in speech
platforms when it is merely taking sides in a currently contested debate and
not seeking to prevent direct harm from the expression itself. Thus,
permitting a “Pro Israel” but not a “Pro Palestine” specialty plate would be
impermissible. The harm from the latter message may or may not be real,
but it is not harm inflicted on a viewer from the mere consumption of the
message, as would be a racial epithet demeaning Palestinians (or Israelis).
And it is not harm based in a widely accepted constitutional norm such as
the equality of citizens and persons.
273. Corey Brettschneider has argued that the state need not be viewpoint neutral when
subsidizing speech. It may (and should) not fund speech that “is directly at odds with the ideal of free
and equal citizenship.” Brettschneider, supra note 162, at 629; see also BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note
79, at 116. He suggests that this idea might apply to limited public forums as well. Brettschneider,
supra note 162, at 635 n.79.
274. See, e.g., ACLU of N.C. v. Tennyson, 815 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2016) (post-Walker;
authorization of pro-life but not pro-choice specialty license plate permissible viewpoint-based
government speech); Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004) (preWalker; authorization of pro-life but not pro-choice specialty license plate unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination).
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I recognize that these lines are difficult conceptually and in practice.
For regulation of private speech, negative theory concerns are sufficient to
forbid all of the viewpoint restrictions just discussed (hate speech, abortion
speech, Israeli-Palestinian speech). But speech platforms occupy a space
closer to (though not identical with) state speech, and we should permit
some viewpoint restrictions, subject to the kind of close scrutiny and
factors discussed in the preceding two paragraphs.275
CONCLUSION
When the government provides opportunities for private persons to
speak, it should be able to forbid hateful or vulgar messages.
Unfortunately, current First Amendment doctrine doesn’t allow this. It
either converts these settings into state speech, thus permitting message
discrimination, or it insists they are limited public forums, subject to a rule
against viewpoint restrictions. The Court and commentators have started
down this path through a mistake about misattribution; they have
incorrectly assumed that people will improperly attribute private expression
to the state. In Walker, this mistake contributed to the Court’s holding that
a private group’s Confederate flag specialty license plate should be seen as
state speech and thus that Texas may refuse to authorize it.276 But if we see
the specialty plate setting for what it is—a forum for a myriad of private
messages, not reasonably attributable to the state as speaker—then doctrine
leaves us with the Walker dissent’s conclusion that forbidding the
Confederate flag plate would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
States, though, should have discretion to reject hateful or vulgar messages
in forums they create for private speech. Just as we permit government
speech that favors some viewpoints over others, so should we permit some
viewpoint restrictions in limited public forums. To signal this shift, and to
more accurately describe what’s happening in these settings, we should call
them speech platforms. These might include specialty or vanity license
275. Leslie Gielow Jacobs also seeks to reconceptualize some of the limited public forum
doctrine to account for public sensibilities. See Jacobs, supra note 182. She would grant more discretion
when the state is “exercising a significant didactic role in a special enclave,” id. at 1403, or when it is
protecting truly captive audiences. See id. at 1404–06. Limiting subject matter and mode of
communication are okay, says Jacobs, but not viewpoint restrictions, generally speaking. See id. at
1408; see also id. at 1376. She would permit exclusion of vulgar speech in what I am calling speech
platforms, but she deems this a mode or subject matter restriction. See id. at 1414–17. She also would
permit exclusion of hate speech, but wants to avoid viewpoint discrimination by insisting on specific
rules (perhaps even a list of disallowed words). See id. at 1421–23; see also id. at 1414. Jacobs mostly
advances the standard concern with viewpoint restrictions, even in speech platforms; I have argued in
the text that we should relax that concern in this setting. We can’t restrict racist hate speech and deny
that we are restricting a viewpoint.
276. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
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plates, ads on public transit vehicles, or public school classrooms used for
after-school activities. The state should be able to set up such platforms but
not be forced by the First Amendment to help foster all messages. We can
relax our concern with the politics of line drawing here as we do with state
speech, while we hold on to it in defending robust free speech protection
regarding state regulation of private speech or rules in traditional public
forums. Accepting the concept of the speech platform would have allowed
the Court to decide Walker the same way but for the right reason: Texas
may exclude racist viewpoints from the private speech platforms it
establishes.

